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Th:s the,is is a case study of lhr V n Osprey progr~ 1T1 It examines dUill -
so urcing of major weapon system s which was the origin~[ acqu isition strategy fo r the 
V-22. It examines the history 01- the V-22 program management. The chronology of 
the prog ram is presented from the birth of the l o int Srrvices Ai rcra ft Program in I~SI 
through the engineering, manufacturi ng and developmen t phase in 1994 . The focus of 
this thesis IS to look at the re la tionshi p between the loint Program Office. the parent 
companies of Bell Helicopter. Inc. and Boei ng Helicopte r, Inc. , and I.he Government. 
The thesis also looks at other strategies that have been used in major weajXIn sy~te rns 
procu re ment, sllch as the riA- IS aircraft program which i , being procured unde r a 
50le source strategy. This thesis concludes that the acquisition o f the v-n has not been 
efficient and that Bell and Boeing Aircraft Companies. operating under a teaming 
concept. have not presented a single face to the Go~'ernment. 
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A. BACKGROLJ~D 
I. INTRODl:CTlON 
;'lIaneuver From the SC'd 
inland from positions over 
will vast ly complicate an 
opponent's defensive problem and will subsI3nliaily reduce 
losses, we must replace the fleet of slow, medium 
helicopters, many of whic h are older the pilots 
We expect to replace the CH-A.6 Medi um Lift Alternative, which 
will <;CTVC as the b<lckbone of the Marine Corps' assault support force 
well into the 21 st century. This aircraft will provide a quantum 
improvement in mobility and tactical tleAibility, complementing the 
revolut ionary technology incorporated in the Advanced Amphibious 
Assault Vehicle and pcmlilling unpn::cctkntcd maneuver by amphibious 
forces. The MV-22 is the Deparrmenr 's highest aviatioIl priority of the 
Marine Corps. (Department of the Navy 1994 Posture State-menl. 1994. 
pp. 22-23) 
The V-22 Osprey tilt rotor aircraft, as currently planned. is scheduled to replace 
the CH-46D/E and CH·53D helicopters that arc currently being used by the Marine 
Corps. Additionally the U.S. Navy is planning the V-22 for Search and Rescue (SAR) 
and Combat SAR missions. while the U.S. Air Force is considering using the Osprey 
for special operations missions. The CH-46 and CH-53 aircraft entered service during 
the Vietnam War years of the 1960s. Since their introduction, numerous modifications 
and airframes changes have occurred that have cxtended these aircrafts' service lives 
and increased their mission capabi lities. Howcver, as they are now approach ing the 
end of their useful service li ves. it is time to replace the CH-46E and CH·53D that are 
currently in ser.·ice with the Marine Corps. Several aircraft have been considered for 
their replacement and the V-22 Osprey developed by a team of Bell Helicopter, 
Incorporated and Boeing Helicopter, Incorporated was selected. To manage this team a 
joint program office was established that would represent the two companies to the 
Govemmenl. As the program progressed, it became apparent that the joint program 
office did not have the full autonomy that was required to properly rcpresent each 
company. According to the Government' s Procuring Contracting Officer (PCO), this 
ha'i been a frustrating experience for the Govemment where often times the 
Government Program Manager or Government's Contracting Offi cer have had to deal 
direc rl y with rhe parent co mpani es \'icc [hc joi nt program onice (lnter1v iew with Rage, 
H"nry. 1994). This thesis will at tempt to identify weak'lcsses in the teami ng concept 
and propose a po~sible <;()Iution in order to encourage companics to engage in teaming 
so that the Armed Forces of the United Statcs receivc the best possible eq uipment at 
fair and reasonabic pri ces. 
B. PURPOSE 
The V-22 program is currently in an Engineering and Manufacturing 
Development (EMD) contract. This E:VfD contract originally was a letter contract with 
defl11itization occurring in October 1992. The original acquisition strategy called "or at 
least two contractors to compete with the final selection on a competitive wind tunnel 
"fly -off." Only one proposal was received and that was from the Rcl l-Boeing team. 
This teaming agreement was originally signed in May of 1982 and specified an equal 
division o f effort which included all V-22 contracts with the Government with in five 
years after fi rst production delivery. This division of effort also included any other 
Government tilt rotor developments prior to the V-22 . It was agreed that there would 
be cross-panicipation in all tasks and that al l data used for the V-22 would be made 
available to either partner for any purpose. 
In the area of management, a Bell-Boeing executive summary of the Joint 
Program Office stated: 
ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEME?>.1 - A steering 
committee composed of the presidents of Bell and Boeing will provide 
advice and guidance and resolve problems which may arise. Bell and 
Boeing shall establish a 10int Program Office OPO) to be staffed equally 
by Bell and Boeing. The Program Director and Technical Director will 
be appointed by Bell and the Deputy Program Director and Deputy 
Technical DirlXtor by Boeing .. 
It went on to say: 
The Bell-Boeing Joint Program Office (11'0) is the single point of 
contact for the Government and provides overall program direction to 
Bell and Boeing, including Program Policies and Procedures. The lPO. 
with Bell and Boeing support, has negotiated the I~SD contract and 
estahlished the work split between Bell and Boeing. (Smith 1989, pp. 
11-12) 
For the six full-scale development aircraft, called for in the Full-Scale 
Development (FS!)) contran, Bell would be responsible for the wing, nacelle, 
prop.,I'iOn, <l~d R.oeing would 
development 01" trle fu<,eiage, empennage, 
pp. I 
am: Flight control, (Smith. 1989. 
fhis pmgralll arrangement ha, generated ,peciflc qde<,tions wrlidi this 
will se;;k to answer. 
1'h<: prif':ary r~.search questioll 
• Wlldl lessons should be i.earrted from the relationship" e<,ta blishec between the 
V-22 Joint Program Office. the parent companies of Bell and Boeing. and the 
Government? 
The .~uh<,idiary research questions ;m~: 
• What io; the contractual relationship between the Bell and Hoeing Helicopter 
companies and how have they shared <:ost~. risks. and proiit? 
• What are the principal difficulties <lssociated with thi~ teaming arrangement 
and what arc the incentives to each (;ompany to overcome these difficulties? 
• Can te<lming facilitate periorman(;e in the best intere<;ts of the (;ol/emment 
and the respe(;(ive (;ontra(;(ors? 
• In a teaming arrangement can the respective companies a<.:ting through a joint 
program office present a "single face" to the Government? 
C. BE1\EFlTS OJ< STUDY 
Current funding, along with the continuing decline of the Defense Dcpanmenl 
Budget and possible reorganization of roles and missions of the Armed Services, make 
it imperative that current and future weapon systems be procured with total costs 01 
ownership in mind. Instabilities throughout the world will continue, consequently the 
operational tempo of U.S. Naval Porces will COIltinue to be high. If the Department of 
Defense (000) is going to continue to pla(;e a high priority OIl leading edge technology 
..... eapon<. then the cost of acqui ~ ition will continue to be high. If the V-22 is to meet 
the Marine Corps' medium lift requirements well into the next century, then it is 
imperative that acquisition strategies such as teaming be explored now and those 
problems identified hy this research he efficiently resolved. Through this research. the 
Na~'y(Marine Corps team win havt~ better availability of information for Ilew weapon 
systems r'rocuremenl. 
D. SCOPE OF THESIS RESEARCH 
fhis will be a case ~tudy of the V -22 prOCUfCment and how the teaming 
arrangement has been u.'>ed by Bell and Boeing. It will abo (;ite othtr arrangl:ments 
currently m e xi stence in DolJ/l ndus tria l contracts, Speci iic ar..:as that will be addre~>ed 
include the rclationsh ip and undcrstand ing between the parent companies. ,he exchange 
of technology. and the protectIon of technical data righ ts and trade sec re lS 
This study will not atte mpt to ju stify the new for the aircraft. This thesis is 
instead a compilation. through extensive inten' iews and research. of opin ions and 
historical facts from wh ich the findin gs and conclusions have bcen i! lfcrred. No 
classified information is conUiined in thi s thesis. A basic knowledge of major weapon 
system acquisition is assumed. 
E. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The collection of research data has been comprised of a literature sca~ch 10 
gather and analyze data from organi7-<ltions such as Naval Air Systems Command 
(NAVA IRSYSCOM1. Boeing Helicopter. Bell Helicopter. V-22 Joint Program Office. 
previous thesis work, and the Defense Logist ics Studies Information Exchange 
(DLSIE). Additionally, interviews were conducted with members of the V-22 Program 
Office. V-22 Procuri ng Contracting Officer, NAVAIRSYSCOM. and the parent 
compantes. 
F. ORGANIZATION OF 11IE STUDY 
This thesis is comprise<! of five chapters, Chapter 11 will introduce dual -
sourcing as used in the DoD. its strengths and weaknesses and its use as a strategy to 
ensure competition. Chapler III will explain the history of Ihe V-22 and why it was 
chosen as an evolutionary step between rotary and fixed-w ing aircraft. Additionally. 
the Chapter will examine how Bell and Boeing became a team to produce the aircraft 
and their individual agendas for the Joint PTogram Office. Chapter IV will be an 
analysis of the Bell-Boeing teaming arrangement as well as other stralegies that havc 
becn used in major weapon systems procurement. Chapler V will consist of 
conclusions and recommendations. 
lI. Ol:Al"-SOVRCING OF MAJOR WEAI'ON SYSTEMS 
A. INTRODUCTIO\1 
Chapler !. presenlt:d the Marine Corps' vi.,ion of replacing the CH-4of)/E and 
CH-53D wit h the V-22 Osprey for the 21 st century. The purp()se of this thesis , ;dong 
with its benetits. was discussed. The scope of research, llicthodology uscd and 
organization of the study were a i.'>O e:\p\ained . Chapter II will d iscuss the stralCgy of 
dual-sourcing, which was the original intent o f the V-22 program. Various me thoos of 
dua l-sourcing will be discussed; the V-22 and MK-48 ,\DCAP Torpedo will be 
introduced which highlight two dual -:>ourcing methods. Cost and pricing data, along 
with costs and competition in gcncldl. will also be discussed as Ihey intluence decisions 
in a dual-source environ ment. 
R. BACKGRO~'D 
rhe Government's initital strategy for the procurement o f the Y-22 was 10 form 
a team of aircraft manufacturers, Once the members of the tcam were qual ified to 
produce the aircraft, the team was to be split and a dual·'j()urce would be availab:e for 
the procurement. It was thought that thi s strategy of establi~hing a dual -source carly in 
the production of the aircraft would create efficiencies through competition which 
would result in lower prices to the Government. (Interview with Major Pat Go<xI, 
1(94) 
The Depanment of Defense uses dual-sourcing in the acquisition process to 
obtain competition in (he buying of weapon systems. (n the past, dual-sourcing was 
U'.ed to obtain a second source for a particular weapon system after the system was in 
production. The passage of the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) in 19K4 
provided the means to obt.ain cost savings through dual-sourcing. Dual -sourcing brings 
competition into an acquisition which results in lower prices to the Government. Also 
provided by ClCA was the maintenance of a mobilization bast and research and 
development capability within the industrial base of the United States. (Hampton, 
19K4, p. 7) 
A review of the evolution o f the systems acquisitions process reveals that as 
systems be<;ame more technically complex and expensive, the selection of a system 
contractor was made on technical considerations early in the acquisit ion process. 
Program managers selected the winning contractor as ~ly in the process as possible to 
minimize the COStS of keeping two COl1lradors Involved through full -scale dev~lopmcnt 
(Hampton. 1984. p. 7) 
During the I 960s. procurements generated large cost overru lls 
and led to a general concern by Congress the 
process. Thi s concern resulted in several 
Tim~ schedules were compressed through use o f 
Design overlapped development and d~ve lopment 
production . Crash programs were instituted and special offices were 
created with authority to command the needed resources for system 
development and to cOIllmunicate quickly through streamlined channels 
with higher echelons. (Hampton. 1984. p. 8) 
The defense industry has, over the years, el(isted in a rolkr coaster environ ment 
o f highly lucrative multi-billion dollar contracts when defense spending was high . 
contrasted with llnel(pected personnel layoffs and loss of capital during periods of 
constrained budgets, when hardware projects were suddenly drop~ or drastically 
reduced in scope. (Hampton. 1984, p. ifi) Through it all. contractors and thc 
corporations who have tailored their services and products toward the defense market. 
have vied for the contract that would almost certainly bring substantial protits and 
stabi li ty to their companies, at least in the near tenn. Once a mission need is 
established, the design stage of acquisition has been a comfortable position for 
contractor competition in which the Government can then sclect the best product for thc 
best price. It is during the production phase where the majority of to tal program costs 
are incurred and the cost of maintaining dual-sources may force the Government into a 
sole-source situation. The prime contractor has his foot in the door when cost over-
nms and price increases begin. Due to the complexities and proprie tary nature of many 
of our modem combat systems, there is really not much that can be done other than to 
work with the contractor and pay the higher price. In an attempt 10 spur competition 
during the production phase of weapons aC{juisition, efforts have been made to establish 
dual-sources for all new aC<luisitions. and also for many on-going defense weapon 
system programs. (Hampton, !984. p. 18) 
Dual-sourcing during production occurs when two or more fi rms are qualified 
and capable of fu rnisbing Government requirements with contract award proportions 
determined by price. Each firm/contractor is assured an award for a portion of the 
annual buy. This should ensure that sufficient capahility el(ists to continue production 
of thc product through two competitive sources. The main reason for uti lizing a dual-
sonrce strategy IS to obtain reductions in proCl lrelnent CO\IS Iw 
compete on a pr!ce basis for the largest quantity of production 
Acqllls:l:on personnel art: cont:erned wi th the pr' ldcn : e-Xpclldltllrc of' public 
funds . For exampk, a decision to dual-source a weapon '>ySlem during proouction 
resu lt'i in additional costs and pote nt ial bt~neflts to the Government. If the deci sion is 
made on the- ba~is of cost reductions , these cOSts and benefits must be quantified. 
However, there are other advantages to dual -sourcillg sllch as expand ;ng the industrial 
base, enhancing surgt: capability in time of war, and providing more than one source 
for product innovation which may prove difficult. If not impossible, to quantify 
accurately. Along with these advantagcs there art di\.1.dvantages to be considered 
including time and cost to ooucate a second source, higher program administrative 
costs, and variations of quality hetwt:Cn sources . 
fo be able to Imp1cmt:nt dual award s for military procurement, a second sourct: 
of supply must ex ist or be created. The cost~ of creating a second source of supply to 
hegin production when not already estahlished or producing can be very high. Tht: 
investments, tool ing, and other stan-up costs needcJ by the second contractor which 
h<lve already been inc urred by the prime will be incurred hy the second source, 
therefore the Government as wcll. 
Dual awards require that both contractors bidding on an annual huy are 
guaranteed a ponion of that quantity. The ponion of the award that is guaranteed 
reprt:sents the minimum level of production the contractor requires to stay in 
production. The efficiencies and advantages gained in using competition are weakened. 
Due 10 the splitting of the production quantity between the comractors. neither may be 
able to fully reali7.c the economics of scale. Thi~ well-known economic theory states 
that as the scale of production becomes larger, the efficiency of production increa,es 
and item~ can be produce<! at a lower COSI. This is caused by the increase in 
specialization of job~ and improved usc of resources, machines, and people. (Dolan 
and Lindsey, 1988, p. 581) 
There afe two gencral means of developing competition in production. First. 
where a second source is developed for an cstablished sole-source program. Next, 
where production competition plans have been decided and are inherent in the 
acquisition strategy for fielding a new system . Both ease~ will involve sign ificant 
additional up-front costs 10 the Government along with involvl-d and potcn tia lly c:-itical 
contractual negotiations. The earlier a firm decision is made for dual-sourcing, the 
higlier tile probabi lity or" <,uccess for execut ion of the <,\ ra tegy froUl a contractlla l and 
cost perspective. (Bog!:r and l iao. 1988, p. 15) 
C. ~1ETHODS 
The method of dual ' sotlrcing used follows one of the followin g five techniques: 
form·fit·function. techn ical data package. directed licell', ing . leader-fo llower. and 
comrac\or tealTIlIlg. 
1. Form-fit-Function 
This method provides the second source with fu nctional spec ifications such as 
sil.e. weight, and performance parameters. 
Th is concept is typically thought of as the black OO:\: case and is 
normally employed where e:\:pendable, nonrepairable items within a 
component system. rather than large comple:\: equipment in order to 
preclude logistical difficulties in technical repair and parIS support in the 
field. (Spangler. 1990, p. 9) 
The main advantage for this method of dual-sourcing is that it is an casy means to 
solicit competition. The contractor can employ any method that meets the 
Government's requirements and Government monitoring of contractors is minimized. 
This should allow for reduced avera!! costs per unit since the contractor is using his 
own existing manufacturing process. Minor disadvantagcs includc source selection 
cri te ria that have to be carefully selected in order for the contractor to be aware of the 
implications of the critical performance elements and the abilit)' to produce. and 
developmental efforts required by every procurement lead to higher program 
acquisit ion costs. 
2. Technical Data Package 
This is a stand alone package that contains sufficient manufacturing data to 
enable a second source, who may not have been involved in the init ial development or 
production of a system, to produce the required item. No engineering or 
manufacturing liaison betwccn sources is specified. Before the Government can use 
this tech nique it must acquire the technical data package either from the systems 
developer or through reverse engineering and have unlimited rights to the technical 
data. According to SECNAVINST 4210.9 of 25 January L988: 
A level lIT package consists of the complete set of engjneering 
rlrawings and instructions which fully describc characteristics of each 
component part, subas.sembly and end' item . as well as detailed physical 
and performance characteristics, quality assurance provisions, materials 
10 tJ<: \I, ..:d. :i nti In~1'1 u l-3CI '.l r H! g: p rocc~ s<: s 10 be followed (Spangler. 
1990. p. 18) 
rhe primary advantage of using tec hnique is once tne Gov(;mment has valida ted 
the technical data package it can be used again and again to mainta in comoetition 
However. the P'-OCCS<; of va lidating the technical da ta package can be costly and t,me 
consum ing and once it has been validated the Government assumes respon , ibili ty for its 
aCCUral)'. Once the Government assumes thi s reS!Xln sibiltty, it is tnen liable for its 
accuracy if another source manufactures to the spec ific ations contained in the technica l 
dalll package, Also. the second source may not be able to manufacture fro:n the 
technical data package because o f differences in manufacturi ng techniques of the two 
3. Leader-follower 
Under tile leader· follower tech nique. the system developer or sole-source 
contractor serves in a leader role to provide manufacturing assistance and know -how to 
facil itate a follower company to become a capable source for a component or complete 
system. A direct contractor-to-contractor technical data transfer occurs. This methoo 
is generally used when a second source would be unable to produce without the leader's 
assIstance. rhis assis tance could involve materials SUP!Xlrt, training or technical 
a,sistance. The primary advantage of thi s method ir,cludes the minimization of the 
burden of technology transfer and enhance<! use of the leader' s capabilities. 
Disadvan tages include the cost of giving the leader incentive to participate. the 
addi tional burden upon the Government to oversee this process, and possible re lational 
difficulties that may exist between the potential leader and follower companies 
4. Direr! LiceosioJ!: 
This method requires that when a company develops a second source, It lS 
compensate<l by royalties or fees for technology trdIlsfc:r and licensing. The sy,tem 
developer retains rights to the proprietary data and maintair,s system responsibility. 
A.dvantages include minimization of the Government burden associated with technology 
transfer. the introduction of competition early in the process, and the ut ilization of the 
developing contractor' s unique cap.1bi lities. Disadvantages include the cost of 
motivating the developer to enter into licensing agreements, possible reluctance or 
unwillingness of the initial contractor to cooperate with the 5eCond source, and high 
royalties or licensing fees may overshadow any gains made by the increased 
competition. 
5. Cuntractor Teaming 
Individ\lal contractors co rnbine to form tealJl~ who. in turn. compete III the 
design selection phase with other similarly formed teams. Each team member designs 
and fabricate s speedic ,>ub'>yslems and components of the system. with each uit im;,'ely 
sharing design and manufacturing data with each other. The team members must he 
competellt and capable of producing the joint design on their own. The contractors 
enter into a teaming agreement with subsequent award of the contract to that team. For 
dual-sourcing '0 be accomplished through teaming. at some poim during production the 
team will split with each member becoming a manufacturer of the entire system in their 
own right. The reSlkctive teams will each be producing the entire system and be in 
dir\:Ct compdition with each other. This may aJ>o be accomplished through the award 
of the prime cont,act to one of the team members with a requirement to subcontract 
with the other team members. Teaming has the advantage of combini ng innovation and 
design assets of the teamed organizations, maintaining and increasing the industrial 
base. and avoiding the difficulties associatoo with licen~ing and royalty fees. 
Disadvantages include possible violation of anti-trust laws. and increased contract 
evaluation costs because many contractors are involved. 
D. COMPARISON OF TECHNIQUES 
Examples of two dual-sourcing te.::hniques being ut ilized for the procurement of 
two completely independent weapon systems will now be discusscd. The V-22 is being 
procured through the contractor teaming method and the MK-48 Advancoo Capability 
(ADCAP) Torpedo under the leader-follower technique. 
I. V-22 
The contracting teams for the V-22, as previously mentioned. are the Boeing 
and Bell Helicopter companies. While these companies' expertise lie in the 
development of fhed wing and rotary wing aircraft respectively, this was a logical 
team arrangement to design an aircraft that has the unique capabilities and perfonnance 
characteristics of both fi)(ed and rotary wing aircraft. 
The V -22 Osprey had been planned for head-ta-helld competition between the 
two compllnies beginning with the second production year's award (U.S. GAO Repon 
to Congress, 1986, P. 2). The first year's production of aircraft was to be ~plit so that 
the Bell-Boeing team would jointly produce the first eight aircraft which would validilte 
the design and manufacturing processes. Then the individual team memhers would 
each independently produce two of the remaining four aircraft in order to qualify as 
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prodllctlon sources. A more detai led disCl:ssion of l il t' Beil-Boelng teaill 100low ~ 
Cha[)tcr [Il. 
2. Teaming rroblerlL'; 
A problem thai may arise here is that issues or problems that occur must be 
resolved first at the team leve l and then are referred to each respective corporation for 
review. Thi s may er.tail reco:1ciliation between the two corporate hcadqllarte~s. Also 
the respective learn members may nOI want to split the team and go inlO direc t 
competition with cach other when the project ends. Generally, the problem is that the 
learn prefers the existing relationship over the approaching competition in which they 
may attempt to exercise the power of a sole-source. 
Another problem with managing a program with a teaming concept is the more 
complex and demanding cffon. Problems will arise such a~ dealing with two or more 
sets of management structures, and the physical distance of the team members' 
corporate offices in relation to the Joint Program Office. Also it must be noted that 
two different Defense Contract Management Command (DCMC) offices in different 
regions must be dealt with. Additional ly, "a problem that occurs during a teaming 
project is that executives in the joint venture are sometimes still holding positions in 
their parent corporations as well as the joint team. ~ (Corcoran. 1991, p. 103) 
3. MK·48 ADCAr 
The MK-48 ADCAP was the follow-on heavy torpedo for the Navy ' s MK-48. 
Then Secretary of the Navy. John Lehman, made the decision to dual-source the MK-
48 ADCAP in late 1983 when the program was in the full-scale engineering phase. 
~ecause of the high technical complexity. the leader-follower 
technique was selected to ensure obtaining effective competition. This 
technique al lowed for dual-source procurement immediately rather than 
using one of the other methods which would have delayed procurement. 
(Coyne, 1991, p. 48) 
During the time of mil itary build-up in the early 1980s, a major concern of weapons 
procurement was cost growth of individual weapon systems, [t was decided to dual-
source the MK-48 ADCAP in order 10 avoid unnecessary program cost growth. 
TIle lead contractor chosen was Hughes Corporation. The primary reason for 
selecting Hughes as leader was that they were an experienced missile guidance and 
control manufacturer. with a robust reputation for engineering prowess in digit.aJ 
technology. With Hughes' help the Navy began a search to find a suitable follower for 
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tile torpedo produ~tion. In April of 1986. Gould Corpof:ltion was sele..:ted by Ih" 
Deputy Commander. Naval Sea Systems Command, \Veapons and Combat Sy~tem as 
the follo wer to Hughes Corporation. Gould had previously been sole -soun:e for the 
MK-48 but had not developed the capabilities to manufacture and engineer the recent ly 
developed digital electronics. Thc original competitive l\1K-48 ADCAP demonstration 
and validatiorl Request For Proposal (RFP) was issued in November 1978. This RFP 
addressed the requirements contained in the original operational requirements to meet 
an emergent Soviet threat. The RFP required the COrltJ<lctor to provide 20 prototype 
guidance and control sections along with supportirlg equipment. A tOlal of five 
proposals were received in response 10 the RFP including ont: from the team of Hughes 
Aircraft Company and Gould, [rlC. Hughes, a neophyte in torpedo production and 
development, was to perform the guidance and control dt:velopment and overall 
systems integration. Gould was \0 build Ihe afterb<xly, tailcone, fuel and propulsion 
systems. (Coyne. 1991, p. 28) 
The primary reason for selccting Gould as follo wer to Hughes was their 
previous experien(;t: with MK-48 production wh ich would be transferable to the 
ADCAP version (Coyne, I99J, p. 12). A key point in the rela tionship between 
Hughes and Gould was Ihal Gould had previous experience in MK-48 production and 
Hughes had to rely on Gould to be able to qualify to manufacture a portion of the 
torpedo. Thi s promoted a working relationship b<tsed on cooperation and mutual 
berleiit. Since Hughes had no prior ex.perience manufactllring torpedoes, this 
,trengthened the relationship between the two companies. 
4_ Leader-Follower Problelllii 
Some of the problems previously mentioned with teaming may also occur with 
the leader-follower tcchnique. For example, the Government must deal with both the 
leader and the follower's management structures, often located in different geographic 
reglOns. Also, two different DCMC offices are involved with a leader-follower 
arrangement. Additionally, problems may arise if one or both companies irl\'olved 
attempt to acquire the necessary expertise Ihal they lack from the other company. This 
would have the effect of giving one company an unfair advantage over the other in Ihe 
future. 
E, COST A..c"'ffi PRICL"'JG DATA 
As prt:viously mentiorled, dual-sourcing is a procuremen t techniqut: in wh ieh the 
total requirement is splil belween Iwo contractors. This allows Ihe Governmenl and the 
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contractor to e xploit the Tlla rket ');tl!atiorl to their own ac-an tagr, The large r share of 
lhe requirement go.:s to lhe low bidder and the smaller share to the high bidder, It 
must be determined lhal adequate price competition ex ist,. It cannOI be assumed that 
dual-source prices are fair and reaMlnabk without some anal ysis into the basis o f a 
contractor', prices. (Boge, and Liao, ]!J88, p. 16) It is at thiS point tha t the 
contracting officer may need cost and pricing data to determine whether appropriate 
imce competition ex)sts. JuSI ~causc a requirement is being dual -sourced does not 
necessarily mean that true competition exists. It is normally presumed however, that 
adequate price competition will exist on dual-source procurements. In ordcr to cnsure 
that contractors propose the lowest price possible, the Federal Acquisition Regulation 
(FAR) provides contracting officers the means to obtain adequate cost and pric ing 
information. When a contracting officer does obtain cost and pricing data, this 
provides a sound basis of the contractor's proposed pri<.:es and the contracting officer is 
therefore in a better position to negotiate any ~duct ions to the contractor's proposal. 
F. COSTS 
[n a dual-source environment, it is too important a consideration 10 aSSllme that 
adetluate price competition automatically exists. There is a need to obtain information 
on a contractor's propose<:! dual-source prices as a way of determining whether 
adequate price competition exists and fair and reasonable prices are being negotiated. 
It should be noted that when evaluating a contractor's prices, since the production 
quant ity is being split, the Government will lose some savings. The smaller production 
rate between the two contractors will probably mean higher unit costs because neither 
contractor is able to fully realize the economies of scale (Dolan & Lindsey, 1988, p. 
563). The basis for using dual-source competition is that the bid prices should be lower 
under a competitive environment as compare<:! to a sole-source acquisition. thus 
resulting in a net savings to the Government. (Hampton, 1984. p. 22) 
When reviewing a contractor's costs, the following points should be include<:! in 
the analysis. Does the proposed pricc rellect accurate material estimates? Arc labor 
and indirect e)(pense rates higher than those n:.'U)mmended by organiutions such as thc 
Dcfense ContraCt Audit Agency? Is the prolit rate highcr on thi5 contract than similar 
noncompetitive contmct~ previously awarded 10 this contractor"? Do prices reflcct 
material price reductions that the contractor should e)(pect to achievc uuring proouction 
or during negotiations with vendors? 
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The prime/sub contractor re lationship appears to lend nse lf to cost increa,es 
since the Government is dealing wi th two independent contractors. This mean, that the 
liovemme!l\ may he paying double for overhead, profit and other de,ign expenses. 
However, when a Joint teaming arrangement is used instead of a prime/suh 
relat ionship. CO!l\ractors may be discouraged from applying overhead and profit on top 
of the other team members. (Hampton, 1984, p. 23) 
G. COMPETITION 
A discussion of competition enahles one to undentand how dual-sourcing can he 
used by the Government to fu rther its goals of procuring goods and services at the 
lowest possible pri(.;e to the taxpayers. It appears that the Depart ment of Defense is 
depending more and mon: on the market place to provide adequate competition and this 
competition is thought to work better than procuring from a sole-source. The adoption 
of the Competition in Contracting Act of \984 has had a great deal to do with the way 
the Department of Defense now manages its procurement func tiom. It is generally 
a(.;ceptcd that competition lowers procurement prices and indirectly improves product 
quality . Full and open competition is probably the best arrangement to employ and 
dual-sourcing is probably as close as one can get to full and open competition when 
procuring for large and complex weapon systems such as the V-22 and MK-48 ADCAP 
programs. (Panel Discussion Sponsored by the Military Rcform Caucus, 1990, p. 25) 
Dual-sourcing may create adequate price competition which could be used to produce 
fair and reasonable prices for our weapon systems. On the other hand, 
... the GAO, DoD and the IG have recently given reports that 
rdise questions about whether dual-sourcing can be relied on to ensure 
that prices arc fair and reasonable. They urge that other safeguards be 
employed along with dual-source contracts to ensure that prices are fair 
and reasonable. For e){ample, they suggest that contracting ofticers 
obtain cost and pricing certifications from contractors. (Panel 
Discussion Sponsored by the Military Reform Caucus, 1990, p. 35) 
A contracting officer may seek to obtain cost and pricing data, es~cially if a 
second sourcc has never produced a particular product before or has had limited 
experience in producing the item. Early in a dual-source acquisition program, a 
contracting officer may want to obtain cost and pricing data 100% of the time because 
there arc no learning curve data availahle. Howe .... er, if the particular proouct that is 
being procured has been in produ(;tion for ,everdl years. historical data should already 
be availahle and these data can be used to evaluate the second source. 
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C'ontract ir:g offic e r'i m:151 not assu me tila t adeqllate price ~O ; 11 pe t i t i ol\ exisTs in 
dua l-souTce cunt racts before they obtain >On1C insight in!o the basis of the contractor ' s 
proposed pol icy _ Price analysis alone llSCd to estab lish the reasonab leness of a price IS 
not always an effective indicator of j udging adeq uate price competition. Cost analysis 
must be also used. (Panel Discussion Sponsored by the Milita ry Reform Cauc us. 1990. 
p. 37) If the cost and pricing data supplied by the wntraclOrs are not cert ified lO be 
c urre nt and accurate and are not adequately analYLcd by the contracting ofticer and 
DCAA, then the GO\'CT1lInent is unprotected and has flO recourse to recover money 
from any over pricing that may OCCIlL On the other hand. if a contracting officer is 
getting bids from dual-source competitors and he wants them to submit certified cost 
and pricing data, the time to rcque~t thi s information would be when the Request for 
Proposal goes out. The bidders would then come back with their proposals and the 
proposals would be audited and reviewed. This reviell.' would then be returned back to 
the contracting officer. 
Since most contractors are dependent on suppliers for determining what the ir 
pricing is going to Oe and the Government is developing dual-sources and increasing 
competition, contractors reacting to this may lower their prices in this climate of 
competition. The contractors must be very accurate when detcrming prices and they 
shou ld be cven more accurate as competition increases. This will cause the contractor 
to makc sure its suppliers and subcontractors have their prices in line and at the lowest 
Thus, these lowcr priccs resulting from dual-sourcing shou ld ensure the 
Govcrnment is getting the lowest priccs over the long-run 
When looking at COStS, not a ll are easi ly defmcd and categorized . Direct labor 
and direct materials are always a~SIX i atcd with production and are therefore classifie<l 
<IS a recurring cost. If a contracting officer is attempting to qual ify a second source a 
large amount of direct labor and direct materials may Oe used and these costs would 
then be classified as nonrecurring. 
Also what must be considered by the Government in addition to 
recurring and nonrecurring costs when deciding to proceed with dual-
source competition arc acquisition methods, pricing strategy , total 
requirements and thc planncd production r.ltc. (Bogcr and Liao, 1988, 
p. 48) 
In many dual-source cases. one of the two contractors has been providing the 
g(X)(\ or service longer tban the other. therefore the competitive position of the two 
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contrJctor5 mJY be unequal. Then the r:ompetitive pressure from dual-sollrclIlg may 
diminish or disappear completeiy. [ f the first supplier of a product has developed thaI 
product. then th is supplier will enjoy a cost advantage over the second SOl lrce. 
Generally. the more experienced producer will have lower production costs and can 
llOder-b id the new supplier. 
The w ntracting officer can face a dilemma in e'klblishing a second supply 
source. The combined production capacity may exceed the actual requirements if the 
second source is e~tablished at the same production capacity level a~ the original 
sourcC . If the second sourct::'s production capacity is established at a lower level than 
the first source, the second source would not be in a position 10 bid at the higher 
pt'rcentages of the annual requ irt::ment. this would creatc an unfair advantage for the 
original source. 
H. LOOKJi'\G TO THE FUTl1RE 
Recent events have shown that America. and in panicular the Depanment of 
Defense, will be facing reriods of reduced budgets. This will most likely continue 
through this decade and into the next century . There arc many factors contributing to 
this, mainly the collapse of the Soviet Union and the political will of Congress to 
reduce defici t spending of the Federal Government. Maintaining the industrial base of 
the country will be challenging in the years ahead. One possible means of maintaining 
adequate production capacity for Government procurements is dual-sourcing. As we 
look at the many factors affecting procurement of major weapon systems, one point 
clearly stands out and that is that these systems will hccome increasingly more 
expensive. As the associated research. design. development. and pf(x!uction costs rise 
it will become advantageous for contractors to team in order to share these risks. 
In addition to tht:: two systt::ms mentioned previously, the V-22 and MK-48 
ADCAP, there other systt::ms and programs that will be dcveloped through teaming 
arrangements. such as the Air Force's F-22 fighter and thc Army's Commanche 
helicopter. There arc also many gCNXIs and services r«!uired hy the Government that 
are not as costly as weapon systems that can also be proc ured hy dual-sourcing. With 
proper planning. the Government may look to dual-source goods and services if 
feasible. This could help to ensure that tht:: Government receives an adequate return on 
their investment. and to hclp maintain the shrinking industrial base we are currently 
facing. Howt::ver, if the Government, and in particular contracting oftJcers, are not 
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diligent In the ir duties COSt o, err ll n ~ will continue to be a major problem and ;1( ieq U<l le 
price competition wi ll not occu r, thus the benefits o f d ual -sourcing will not be rcalil.cd 
As was previollsl y mentioned, Bell-Boe ing formed a team fo r the production o f 
the v -22. At that time the Government's strategy was 10 en sure that two sources of 
suppl y weTe available to manu facture the aircraft. The Government was attempt ing 10 
ensure competit ion through a dual-sourcing strategy. However, as will be shown in 
C hapter III, the Bell -Boeing team wi ll not be split and the V-22 will be proc ured via 
sole-source, 
l. SUMMARY 
This Chapler looked at dual-sourcing and specirlcall y how DoD uses dual -
sourcing in the acquisition process. Considerations such as competition, costs, and cost 
and pricing data were addressed. Five dual -sourcing methods were introduced. In 
particular. the v-n Osprey under the contractor teaming method and the MK-48 
ADCA P under the leader-follower technique were discussed. Chapter [[I will present 
the history of the Osprey program and an evaluation of the acquisition strategy. The 
program's chronology will be presented wi th emphasis on Congressional efforts to 
continue the program while DoD, under the Bush admini stration, attempted to 




Ill. IllSTORY OF V-22 PROGRA.1\1l\IANAGEMENT 
A. [l'.lRODL'CTION 
The prev iolls Chapter in troduced the reader to the concept of duai-souTc ing a 
major weapon system, which was the V-22 ' s original acqui,ition strategy This 
origina l strategy called fo r the Bell- Boeing team to be split once the program was in 
production. which would have established the dual -<,ourccs. Chapter [[J will look at the 
origin of the V-22 program heginning with research a ircraft of the 1950s through the 
establishment of the Joint Services Aircraft Program. A chronology of the V-22 
program wil l be presented with emphasis on Congressional support and 000' s 
attempts. under the Bush administration, to canee! the program. 
R. ORlGll' OF l1IE PROGRAt\tI 
The birth of the Joint Service s Aircraft Program can be traced to an August 27, 
1981, Under Secretary of Defense (Re>earch and Engineering) memorandum to the 
Service Secretaries suggesting that the Army 's electronic warfare mission, the Marine ' s 
assault mission, the Air Force's special operations mission, and the Navy ' s ~arch and 
rCs\"ue mission req ui rements might best be met with a single, advanced but mature 
technology, sw.;h as an operational derivative of the XV -IS Tilt Rotor experimental 
a ircr"fl. (U.S. GAO Report to Congress, 1986, p. 2) 
Tilt rotor technology was fITst successfully demonstrated in the 1950's using 
Bell Helicopter' s XV-3 research aircraft. Later, a joint NASA/Bell/Army effort 
resu lted in the successful testing of the XV-15 re~arch ai rcr"ft in the 1970s and 1980s. 
A Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum to the Service Secretaries on 
December ]0, 198 1, formally established the Joint Services Aircraft program. The 
Services regarded this memorandum as approval for concept formulation, waiving the 
need for a Justification for Major Systems 1':ew St.art, the formal need statement. The 
I)eputy Secretary endorsed the Army as the executive Service and a Marine Corps 
officer as the program manager. The Joint Services Aircraft program was to be 
executed acoording to Army standard development and acquisition procedures. The 
O ffice of the Secretary of Defense then directed the Army , Navy, and Air Force to 
each n:program approximately $1.5 million to conduct a joint technical assessment of 
the technology available for the Joint Services Ain:raft system. (U.S . GAO Report to 
Congress, t 986, p. 2) 
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Responding to the December 1981 Deputy Secretary of De!"ense in itia tI ve. in 
February 1982 the Services assembled a joint technical assessment group of expertS to 
develop preliminary point designs and tradeoff options lor the Joint Services Ain:raft. 
The join t technology assessment group completed its assessment in May 1982 and 
concluded that the application of tilt ro tor technology offered the best potential for a 
common multi-service aircraft. The group also concluded that other technology such as 
conventional helicopters. compound helicopters. the advancing blade concept and the 
lift/cruise fan concept were less attractive in terms of speed and worldwide self-
deployability for combined Joi nt Services Aircraft applications than the til t rolor 
aircraft. (U.S. GAO Report to Congress, 1986, p. 2) 
In May 1982 two aircraft manufacturers, Bell Helicopter Textron and Boei ng-
Vertol, anticipating a request for proposals for the design and development of the Joint 
Services Aircraft, teamed together for the Joint Services Aircraft competition. Both 
these companies had prior experience wi th tilt rotor technology. The teaming 
agreement called for Joint production or the Joi nt Services Aircraft through at least thc 
fifth year from initial production delivery. (U.S. GAO Report to Congress, 1986, pp. 
2-3) 
In June 1982 the Army Chief of Staff formally announced the selection of the 
Joint Services Aircraft program manager. At that time the program manager held a 
Bachelor of Science degree in Electrical Engineering and a Maste r o f Science degree in 
~anagemenL The Joint Services Aircraft was the program manager's firs! assignment 
as a program manager. It is interesting to note that he had no previous program 
management or contracting experience. He became involved with the Joint Services 
Aircraft program in June 198 1, as the manager of the Navy forerunner of the Joint 
Services Aircraft program, 
A Memorand um of Understanding concerning the Joint Services Aircraft 
program was signed between the Anny , Navy, and Air Force on June 4, 1982. This 
memorandum established the Joint Services Aircraft program objectives and the 
fund ing approach. The Services agreed !o provide $167 million in tiscaJ year 1984: 
the Army's share was $78 million , the Navy's share was $70 million, and the Air 
Force's share was $19 minion. Funding shared for the remainder of the Joint Services 
Aircraft program agreed to at this time were: Army, 46 percent: Navy, 42 percent; and 
Air Force, 12 percent. The memorandum designmed the Anny as the executive 
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.'~rV I( C. and it req ui red achievement of :he earliest practical initial oJX' rat ionai 
capability. (U,S. GAO Repon to Congress , \986. p. J) 
r he Deputy Secretary of Defense approved th e Joint Services Aircra ft 
acquisition strategy (Army -originated). number P42-J7-0-JO, on 8 December 1982, and 
Naval Air Systems Command officials sig ned the <,tratcgy in January i983 , T he 
acquisition strategy slates that "advanced, bur mature technology based on existing 
demonstrator aircraft will be exploited" Risk reduction techniques mentioned in the 
strategy include : 
• using design, wind tunnel, and fl ight test dala already developed 
during the Army/NASA XV- 15 Tilt Rotor Program; 
• encouraging industrial teaming to exploit a broader technology 
hase; and 
• competing the preliminary de<,ign effort. (U.S. GAO RelXJrt to Congress, 
19)16, p. 3) 
The strategy callcd for competitivc development IIp to fu ll-scale developmcnt 
It also stated that· 
As the Joint Services Aircraft program docs not require a discrete 
demonstration and validation phase, approval of the acquisition strategy 
by the Defense Acquisition Executive precludes the requirement for a 
formal revicw , .. as required by Department of Defense Directive 
5lXJO.l. (U .S. GAO Report to Congress, 19)16. p. 4) 
The strategy al:;o allowed for the Defense Acquisition Executive to make the 
Milestone It program review if the program was within cost and on schedule. 
On December, 13 , 1982, the Secrctary of the Navy approved an addendum to 
the Memorandum of Understanding. This addendum designated the Navy as the 
executive Service for the Joint Services Aircraft program, replacing the Army 
According to the program manager, the Navy became the executive Service because the 
Army had allow~ the initial operational capability date to slip and the Marines had the 
most pressing initial operational capability date. (U .S. GAO Report to Congress, 
1986, p. 4) 
The program manager wrotc the part of the strdtegy regarding schedules and 
dclivery requirements and the Army contrdCting officer wrote the sections regarding 
business and contractual matters. The Navy contracting officer did not playa role in 
preparing the acquisition strategy until the program was transferred to the executive 
leadersh ip of the Navy. At that time the contracting officer provided input into 
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contracting IlldW:rs to have the strategy comply with NJvy contract;:1g philosophioes 
(tJ.S. GAO Report to Congres~, 1986, pp. 1-4) 
Th," Joint Service, operational requirement was approved on 14 I)eccmi)cr 19K2. 
The requirement, document called for an aircraft with a continuolls cruise ,;peed of not 
less than 250 knots and, to meet worldwide self-deployment ohjectives, a mir:mum 
range capahility of 2100 nautical miles, unrcfueled. Anticipated acquisit.ion quantities 
were apprm;imatcly 1100 for all three Services. 
The requirements document favored a tilt rotor design. [t stated that the 
conventional helicopter could not meet Joint Services Aircraft cruise speed and 
worldwide .>elf-deployment requirements stipulated by all three Services. It also stated 
that the tilt rotor configuration could perform all of the Joint Services Aircraft 
missions, using a common, basic air vl:hicle with special mission configurations and 
equipment to meet specific Service requirements. (Tiltrotor - A Brief History, 1991, p 
18) 
In a memorandum issued on 27 Dl:cemlxr 1982. the Under Secretary of 
Defense (Research and Engineering) directoo the Navy to take the ellecutive Service 
lead for the Joint Services Aircraft airframe, while the Army continued a, the executive 
Service for the development of the modern technology engine to be used in the Joint 
Services Aircrafl. The memorandum abo rcappurtionc.d the funding shares previously 
established in the Memorandum of Understanding. 
According to a Navy official, after the Navy took over as the executive Service 
01" the Joint Services Aircraft program, the Naval Air Systems Command oontracting 
officer. Assistant Commander for Contracts, and legal counsel changed the preliminary 
design request for proposals contracting strategy from a fixed-pricc levcl of cffort to a 
cost-plus-fixed-fee arrangcment (Smith, 19R9, p. 7) 
The first Navy contracting officer for the Joint Services Aircraft program wa, 
appointed in December 1982. According to a program official, because of the short 
time fmme between when the Navy was appointed and whcn it took over as the 
executive Service for the program, the contracting officer was appointed on a 
tempomry basis until a permanent contracting officer could be appointed. She was the 
contracting officer for three other programs at that time and had been the contracting 
officer for the progmm that was the Navy forerunner of the Joint Services Aircraft 
program. The second contracting officer for the loint Sen-ices Aircraft was appointed 
in Febru"ry 1983. (O'Brien, 1992, p. 15) 
The program manager re l e~sed a draft request I"or proposals ~'or preliminary 
design to industry lor comments in la te July 19X2. About 269 commen ts were reCI:;vcJ 
and about hal f of these were incorporated into the second draft which was re leased in 
October 1982. The final request was released on 17 January 1983, in '\C~'ordance with 
the December 19R2 Secretary of Defense Decision Memorandum. r he contracting 
o fllce r developed and issued the request. with advice from the program manager. 
(U .S. GAO Report to Congress, 1986. pp. 6-7) 
rhe loint Services Aircraft program followed formal source selection 
procedures. On 5 January 1983, the acting Secretary of the Navy signed the document 
which designated the Commander, Naval Air Systems Command, as the source 
selection authority. fhe SOllrce selection authority then appointed the members and 
chair of the source selection advisory council. The program manager and the Assistant 
Commander for Contracts were both designated as advisers to the source se\e(;tion 
advisory council. In addition, the source seb:tion authority eS!'lblished an evaluation 
board of which the contracting officer was a member, and the program manager was an 
adviser. 
fhe source selection plan was approved by the source selection a'.lthority on \0 
January 1983. The program manager did not have an active role in the plan 
development, whereas the contracting officer provided contractual input into and 
reviewed the plan . 
On 26 April 1983, the wntract for preliminary design was awarded to the 8e11 -
Boeing team. Their proposal was the only one received in response to the request for 
propos.a.l. ror the contr-act award, the program manager assured regulations were 
followed. 111e source selection evaluation board evaluated the proposals. the 
contracting officer conducted the negotiations and issued the contract. The contract for 
loint Services Aircraft preliminary design was awarded on a cost·plus-incentive-fee 
basis, with incentives on cost only. (O'Brien, 1992, p. 18) 
The Navy anticipated two contr-actors would compete during the preliminary 
design stage which would end with a competitive wind tunnel "fly-off' to select the 
winning contr,!(;tor. This plan had to be modified because only one proposal was 
recei ved, even though the preliminary design phase had been e~tended from 15 to 23 
months before the request for proposals was released in hopes of funher stimulating 
interest and competition for the contract. 
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A~'eorctir.g to program officials. Sikor,ky Aircraft actively considered competi ng 
for the preliminary design, but at the last minute decided not to submit a proposaL 
leaving Bell-Boeing the only contender. According to Sikorsky officials. they did nor 
submit a bid because the preliminary design stage did not allow them sufficient time to 
evaluate the tcchnical risks of the program. Sikorsky believed they needed 
approximately 34 months instead of 23 months for preliminary dcsign. However, 
according to the contrdeting officer, Sikorsky notified the N~vy at the last minute that 
they would nttd more time for the prcliminary design stage even though the 
preliminary design stage had already been extended from the original 15 months to 23 
months. Until this time, the comracting officer expected Sikorsky to submit a 
proposal. (U.S . GAO Report to Congress, 1986. pp, 6-7) 
Gmmman Aerospace officials indicated that, although competition was bred into 
the early stages of the program, it was lessened in the later stages as a result of the 
requirements driving the design toward the tilt rotor concept. Grumman did not fault 
anyone for this, calling it a mailer of Service priori ties. (O'Brien, 1992. p. 20) 
A statement by the then Commander of the Naval Air Systems Command also 
addressed the question of why only one proposal was received: 
As to why no other proposal was reccived, it can only be 
surmised . Even with the expansion of the initial effort to 23-months 
work, other industry managemcnt may have perceived that the Hell-
Boeing's lead and prior experience with tilt rotors was insurmountable. 
Even though NASA's complete tilt rotor data package had heen made 
available, they apparently felt that, without a further expansion of the 
effort, i.e., 33 months, the probability of winning was low. The Bell-
Boeing tcam had put thei r company sources at risk and formed working 
teams while the program was still in the formative stages. No one else 
made a comparable commitment. (U.S. GAO Report to Congress, 
1986.) 
The program manager believes a fair competition for the Joint Scrvices 
Aircraft's preliminary design was held . 
• The request for proposals for preliminary design did nOI specifically preclude 
use of alternative concepts. 
Full access to data from the tilt rotor research aircraft, the XV-IS, was 
provided. 
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• Pl iOl<; f rom ~ompcting firms were allowed to tly the XV- 15 dernOnSlfJ10r 
airc raft 
• The draft request I-or proposals was sent to the COnlradors twice for their 
review and comment. 
Ot-ficials said that ait hough the join t assessmcr.t 
concluded the ti lt rotor was a mature technology with low risk. 
other types of designs such as an improved version of a conventiona l 
helicopter conceivahly could have challenged the tilt rotor concepl. 
(U .S. GAO Report to the Rankjng Minority Memher, 1990. p. 3) 
The program managt'T stated that any proposal submitted would have been 
independently and objective ly evaluated on its own merits, regardless of the particular 
concept it proposed. Program officials believe, howevcr. that the ti lt rotor concept was 
the on ly "available and mature" concept that could satisfy the operational requirements 
of the loint Services Aircraft program, particularly its speed and worldwide self· 
depolyability requirements. (U. S. GAO Report to Congress. 1986, pp. 7-8) 
In May 1983 the Army withdrew from the Joint Services Aircraft development 
program but reentered the program follo wing a September 1983 Defense Resources 
Board meeting. The Defense Resources Board approved continuation of the joint 
program, with full funding for loint Services Aircraft common development withiu the 
Navy's total obligation authority. It deleted the Air Force combat search and rescue 
mission and suhstituted an assault need for the Army 's special electronics mission 
aircraft need. The Army plans 10 usc the Marine assault version of the loint Services 
Aircraft for its medium cargo lift and medical evacuation needs, while the Air Force 
plans to usc the Joint Services Aircraft for its special operations forces needs. 
(0' Brien, 1992, p. 33) 
The House and Senate conferees agreed to provide the loint Services Aircraft 
progmm with 588.6 million for fIscal year 1984. All funding was consolidated under 
Navy l{c~rch, Development, Test and Evaluation . The fund i.ng consolidation was 
intended to strengthen the program by assigning control of the funds directly to the 
Service with executive leadership. The Congress appropriated $188.5 million for 
fiscal year 1985 and $580 million for fiscal year 1986. (U.S. GAO Report to 
Congress, 1986, p. 9) 
The Commander, Naval Air Systems Command approved the loint Services 
Aircraft revised acquisition strategy (No. A-42-37·0-40) in lune 1984 and the Chief of 
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Naval Materiel JPproved the strategy in August 191H. The revised strategy reflected 
plans to have Bell-Boeing develop the air~raft as a Joint effort. In November 1984 the 
Commander. Naval Air System, Command and the Commander, Aeronautical Systems 
Division , signed the program manager's charter for the Joint Services Aircraft and the 
Secretary of the Navy selected "OSPREY" as the Joint Services Aircraft's popular 
name . In January 1985 the Joint Services Aircraft was designated the v-no 
In acquisition strategy A-42 -37-0-JO (dated 8 December 1982), the Navy 
estimated the averagc unit cost for the 913 aircraft in the program to be $14.6 million, 
in fiscal year 1983 dollars. An official in the Joint Services Aircraft program office 
indicated that the Joint Ser .... ices Aircraft unit cost was SIS .6 mill ion in fiscal year 1984 
dollars for the 913 aircraft. (U. S. GAO Report to Congress. 1986, p. 10) 
To ensure that both companies were qualified to compete with each other after 
the pilot proouction lot, thcy were required to submit - as a full-scale dcvelopment 
contract deliverable - a production plan that included a technology transfer plan and 
certification that each of their proouction processes were equivalent for aircraft 
delivered under the pilot production lot. This contracting strategy is still subject to 
negotiation between the Navy and the contractor. (U.S. GAO Report 10 Congress, 
1986.p.12) 
C. EVALUATION OF ACQmSITION STRATEGY 
The program manager developed a Joint Services Aircraft contrncting strategy 
driven by operational requirements that, according to some officials, cou ld realistically 
be met on ly hy the proven ti lt rotor technology, As a result, the only response to the 
request for proposals was from the team with prior experience with this technology . 
Although the aCGuisition strategy called for competitive development up to full-scale 
development, the teaming of the technology leaders resulted in early cunailment of the 
competition. Na .... y top management initially accepted the contrdcting strategy proposed 
hy the program manager and contracting officer. Howe .... er, top Navy management 
expressed a desire to change the tenns of the production schedule to one in whi(;h the 
Bel l·Boeing team will compete with production lot one. (The teaming agreement calls 
for joint production through at least the fifth year from initial production delivery). 
The program manager said that bolh Be\1 and Boeing are supporting the Navy's strJtegy 
to split the team. Hoeing stated in a letter that the team recognizes the Navy's right to 
split the team at its direction. 
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D. PROGRA,'l CHRO\ULOGY 
Duri r:g I ~86 program also restructured to pro',ide r'or " fi,,;:ct-price 
incentive contract. On 2 May 1986, Bell-Boeing ..... as awarded a ful' ·;calc develo[lment 
contrall for the Join: Services ,\ircraft airframe with a target bi:lion 
A hrn fixed-pr.ce contract was al>o awarded to Al1i,;,on Gas Turbine Division 0: 
Cicnnal Motors for S76A mi.lion for engine development 
Congn;,s funded the program for fr;,cal years IllX6 through 1991 to the total of 
$2.7 billion of which $2.2 hillion has been for research, developlT,ent test. and 
evaluatio~:. The first Ilight oi" the Y-22 Osprey took place on Sunday. 9 :vlarch 1'lS9 
(l .S. CiAO Report to the Ranking \1inority Ykrnber, 1990, p. 8) 
I. Prognlnl Cancellation 
Prohlems continued to grow for the V-22 program in 1()8fi. The Army 
officially dropped out of the progrdm in I;ebruary, resulting in significant per aircraft 
cost growth. Additionally, program delays and weight growth threatcned thc entirc 
program. (V-22 Price Starting to Climb, 1988, pp. 1-3.) The tlight test program 
slipped from mid-1988 10 March of !989, with the first flight of the V-22 on 19 
March. Congress became actively involved for the first time in 1988 in urging f)of) 10 
investigate the civil applications of tilt rotor technology as a means of lowering overall 
program costs ~!l1d "to give it some resistance [0 current uncertainty in funding." 
(Congress Urg~s 000, FAA, NASA, 1986, pp. 6-7) 
[n June of 1988 the Office of the Secretary of Defen5t (Progrdm Analy,is and 
Evaluation) (PA&E) headed by Dr, Chu relea~ its repo:..lft re(;ommending the 
termination of the V -22 program in favor of a more cost-efTeclive all helicopter option. 
The report remains highly controversial as it was developed ·'in-house" by PA&E 
without input from either the Navy or the Marine Corps. (OSO PA&E Recommend 
Termination of V-22, 1988. pp. 1-4') 
The n:maindcr of 1988 was spent investigaling various contracting options and 
funding plans to keep thc V-22 a viable program. By the end of 1988 there were 
definite signs that the Y-22 was in trouble. [n November OSD cut the Navy's FY-90 
budget request from $1.2 billion 10 $900 million, flmding 21. rather than the requested 
36 produclion V-22s. (Na~·y ·90-'91 Budget cut Y-22 Buys, 1988, pp. 3-4) The 
Marin~ Corps, however, still considered the V-22 its "highcst priority aviation 
program." (Washington Roundup, 1988, p. 11) In March of 19R9 the Secretary of the 
Na":;,, William Ball, recommended a $1 hillion cut in funding and a one-year delay in 
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st"rt o ( proctuctlon The Marine Corps opposer.! both the functing Cllt and tr.e 
production dclay . (Navy Chief Recommtnds $1 Billion Cut, In9. p. 7) 
[n April of 1989, Secretary of Defense Cheney announced the cancellation of 
the Y-2~ based primarily on the recommendation of Dr. Chu. As Dr. Chu stated in his 
earlitr PA&E report. "the Y·22 was a cost prohibitive option co mpared to an all 
hcliwpttr buy of UH-60s and CH-S3Es," (Pentagon Wants V-22 CarKeled, !989. p. 
[8) An amended FY -90 budget was submitted to Congress in May of 1989. deleting 
all fu nding requests for the V-22 and, instead, requested fundi ng for a new medium lift 
replacement alternative study (presumably Chu's all-helicopter optionl. (Naval 
Aviation: The V-22 Osprey, p. 27) 
Congressional response to Cheney's cancellation move was slow to material ize. 
By June the House Armed Services Sub-Committee on R&D had voted to shift $351.8 
mill ion from the B-2 and SDI programs to the canceled V-22 program for FY-90. 
(House Votes V-22 Osprey Money, 1989, p. 1354) Congressional support ror the Y-
22, while always strong, increased markedly from June through the end of the year. 
Representative Weldon and Senator Specter of Pennsylvania became the primary 
leaders of a growing coalition of congressmen who strongly supported continued V-22 
devtlopment. By the end of 1989 this coalition included over 125 members of the 
House and 20 Senators. By November, both the House and the Senate had included 
full R&D funding in their FY-90 budgets despite OSD's request for the program's 
c.'illcellation. Production funding, however, remained tentative . (O'Brien. 1992. p. 
21) 
Congress provided $255 million in RDT&E funding for FY -90, as Rep. 
Foglietta (PA) said, to "anow the Osprey program to fly for another year and to sell 
itself to the Defense Department." (Foglietta Predicts V-22 Will Be Reinstated, 1989. 
p. 5) As part of the FY -90 authorization and appropriations bill. Congress also 
directed OSD to complete a Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis (COEAl snldy 
of the V-22 program. The Institute for Defense Analys i ~ was ta~ked with analysis of 
the V-22. focusing on amphibious assault in a hosti le environment. long-range special 
operations, ovcr-thc-horizon landings, suhse{juent operations ashore. logistical resupply 
to forward deployed forces and self-deployment missions. (O'Brien, 1992, p. 22) 
In December 1989, Secretary Cheney ordered the cancellation of $344 million 
in FY-R9 advance procurement contracts for the V-22 ($260 million of which had nO! 
hcen spent). This decision set off a storm of criticism from Congressional supporters. 
T he dcci.,ion to terminate ex: isling FY-8CJ comracts was termed by R(;p . \>"'eldon as a 
"blat.'ln\ disregard of the defense authori zation proce~s aTld Cor congressional will" By 
ca'1ccl ing the V-22 prOCLJrement Weldon said, "Secretary Cheney di splayed the lllt i J~arc 
in anoganct by trying to administratively subvert the defense budget process while 
Congress was in recess." (V -22 Termination Touches Ofr Congressional Storm. \898 , 
p. 24) Weldon further st.ltcd that ":hc cancel lation decision while Congress was in 
recess would further galvani7{~ congressional support and damage the Pentagon's 
reput.11 ion on the Hi ll." (Congress-DoD Relations Hurt by V-22, 1989, p. 40) 
2. 1990 Congressional Aclion 
In January 1990, sti ll reeling from tht: decision to cancel FY -89 procurement 
contracts, Congressional supporters tried to detennine the legality of Secret.1ry 
Cheney's cancellation order. Despite thei r anger with OSD, however, most supporters 
agreed to abide by the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) COEA recommendations 
which were due to be rele'lscd in April. In the interim. Rep. Weldon continued \0 
solicit support for the program and \0 lobby fellow congressmen. Calling the Pentagon 
"penny wise and pound foolish" he asked for a re-examination of the PA&F. report, 
arguing that life cycle cost analyses would show the Y-22 less expensive. (Weldon 
Predicts $500 Million for Y-22, 1990, p. 193) 
The PA&E report based much of its conclusions on the technique of dual 
slinging heavy vehicles on CH -53E helicopters, thus de<:reasing transport times andJor 
reducing the number of r&jui red helicopters. In testimony before the House Armw 
Services Committee on February 20th, 1990, General Gray, Commandant of the 
Marine Corps, said, "I consider this whole dialogue of dual sling options totally 
ridiculous, it has nothing to do with coming from the sea in a wide variety of 
scenarios .. . it has nothing to do with warfighting. It is totally ridiculous and tactically 
tlawed." (Gray: Y-22 Substitute Scheme Ridiculous, 1990, p. 6) General Gray went 
on to say that a 1989 DoD study found that the helicopter option would cost $6 billion 
more that the Y -22 option. 
In April, a study commissioned by Bell -Hoeing and conducted by the BDM 
corporation found the V-22/CH-53E mix vastly superior in combat effectiveness to the 
all helicopter option but $7 billion more expensive. This was based on a flee t of 602 
V-22s. (BDM Study, 1990, p. 93-94) The IDA rcport was also completed in April as 
mandated by Congress. However, OSD did not release its findings to Congress until 
mid-May. Becausc the rejKm' s V-22 findings were in favor of the Y-22, supporters \!l 
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Congre~s act'used Secretary Cheney of try in g to willfully suppre ss results , (I nsti tute 
for Defen,t Analysis Study the Y-n Osprey. 1990. p. 42) 
.~. 1991-1994 Congrcssionlll Action 
As prcviously stated. Congress authorized and approprialtd 5255 million for 
R&D on the Y-22 pursuant to an agretment reached with the administration that tht 
program wOldd term;nate with R&D and not proceed to prod uction at that time . (The 
Status of the Y-n TiltrOlor Aircraft Program. 1992, p. 3) Tht agreement was that 
000 would cont inlle development of lhe aircraft. In fiseal year 1991 000 was 
authorized $238 million for RDT&E. S165 million for long lead item procurement atld 
S200 mill ion in prior year fu nds for Y-22 R&D. and .~peciflcally prohibittd from using 
thuse funds to try to find an altemativt, affordabk means of meeting the Mari nc Corps 
medium-l ift needs. (O'Brien. 1992, p. 26) 
Congre.% passed its Dcfcnse Appropriat ions and Authorization bill in late 
November 1991 and it is generally hailed as a victory for the Y·22. It provided $790 
million, inc luding SI65 million of prior year procurement funds, to cmbark on Phase II 
full -seale engineering and manufacturing developmcnt. Three pilot production aircraft 
were authorized to incorporate engineering changes identified during night test ing. 
Additionally , it directed the Navy to provide a Test and Evaluation Master Plan 
(TEMP) by 1 May 1992 and rcport results uf current testing to Congress by 15 April 
1992. Finally, the bill prohibited thc Navy from investigating Y-22 alternatives un ti l 
thc results of Phase U were available. (O'Brien, 1992, p. 28) 
[t is intercsting to note that the total planned aircraft procurement had shruflk 
from ovcr 1()()() to 657 at the time the production portion of the contract was canceled. 
It is now generally accepted that yet a much smaller huy will occur if the program ever 
does proceed to the production stage. 
By August of 1992, DoD had not spent the $790 mii1ion because thcy believed 
the Y-22 could not be built to meet the requirements specified in the fiscal year [992 
Appropriations Act. The DoD Gener.u Council made a dctcnnination on that point. the 
point being that it was an cngineering impossibility to comply specifically with the 
statute. 'Iberefore, the DoD was enjoined against signing any contract which they 
knew could not be fulfilled based on the Gener.!1 Council' s dctennination . The 
Secretary of Defense then proposed a comprumi.'iC plan which would require 
implementing legislatiun to repeal fiscal year 1992 direction, thereby. allowing DoD to 
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ust" the t-Iscai year 1992 fU.lds for the contin ued deve10pmem of the V-22 Jlrcrait wh k 
furt he r e;<;pioring Mediu m Lift Requirements (MLR) altc!TIative~. 
As funds were appropriated, the administration appea red to 20m inually fi nd 
various fault'> with the V-22 or with the language contained in various Appropriation, 
A(;ts which would prevent the program from continuing. During Hearings be fore the 
PrOCurement and Mi litary Nuclear Systems Subcommittee of the House Armed Services 
Committee, ~"r. Chet Edwards, representative from Texas. said, 
You know that when DoD supports a program, the lawyers are 
put in the back offices 10 rationalize the problems, and when DoD 
dOt:sn't want a program it brings in the lawyers and decides on some 
way to kill it. Frankly. I think tht discussion of moving the goal posts 
- in this case (don't think tht goal POSts havt been moved, I think the 
football playcrs are on the fitld and 000 decided we are going to play 
soccer. When you arc OP!XIsed to a program, DoD is going to kill it. I 
would like to see the double standard stop. If we are going to play by 
thtse mles, play by the rules on everything incl uding the A/X, SOC B-
2, and thl: C-17. i hope that would go beyond the legal answer you just 
gave a minute ago and apply 10 all major operational requiremtnts. (The 
St.atus of thc V,22 Til trOlOr Aircraft Program, 1992, p. 21) 
Mr. Edwards, representing Tel{as, the homc state of Bell Helicopter, was responding to 
an answtr given by Sean O'Keefe who was then the DoD's comptrolkr and chief 
financial officer. During this tcstimony it appeared that DoD was looking for ways to 
cancel the V-22 program or find an alternative to the Marine Corps' medium lift 
rl:quirement. 
For tiscal year 1993, the House approved $755 mill ion for the FY-93 Defense 
Authorization Bill. These funds were to bc used 10 fund the remainder of the sil{ 
aircraft program. On 25 July 1994, the Senate Appropriat ions SUbcommillee on 
Defense approved $497 mil lion in fiscal year 1995 funding for continuation of V-22 
Engincering and Manufacturing Development. The Senate Armed Services CommiUI:C 
was the last of the four key congressional committees to authorize funding for V-22 at 
DoD' s rC(Juested level. Nel{t on the docket will be full Senate committee decision on 
appropriation of the V-22 funding. Commenting on thl: Scnate action. Sen. Arlcn 
Specter (R-PA) notOO that. 
Aftcr ycars of debate on the val ue of the V-22 program, which I 
have always viewed as vilal to our nat ional security and an im!XIrtant 
]I 
piece ot 
support of the 
it appears that a consensus has been reached in 
(Osprey fax . i994. p. 2) 
The V-22 Program i~ finally moving toward produ<::t ion. four product:on 
representative aircraft are being constructed at Bell and Hoeing, and a~ previously 
ment ioned . a new contract for the EMD phase of production aircraft is in place. A 
fina l go ahead for a limited production of aircraft is anticipated during the Fall of 1994. 
E. BELL·BOEING'S VISION OF TILT ROTOR TECHNOLOGY 
Numerous DoD COEAs as well as additional Government studies have been 
conducted on the MlR. All have concluded that the V-22 is the preferred sol ution. 
The V-22 is the preferred solution for the MLR. It is time to 
formally endorse the V-22 for this urgent Marine requirement. to 
proouce the Osprey for our Naval and Special Operations forces and to 
accumulate the military fleet experience that will open the way for 
realization of the civil applications and economic benefits of thi s 
revolutionary American technology. (Osprey fax. [994, p. 1) 
There are many points of view for the acquisition of the V-22. Congress has been a 
strong supporter of the program; while initially the Administration was also a 
supporter, it is no longer in favor of procuring the V-22. 
The Bell-Boeing team believes that the future importan<::e of tilt rotor technology 
will go wcll beyond the V-22 program. Bell-Boeing firmly believes that organizations 
such as the 10int Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and 000 as a whole should 
take into consideration future commercial sales of the V -22 when deciding what will 
meet mediu m lift requirements for the Marine Corps. Bell-Roeing believes these 
dimensions include not only the application of tilt rotor' s unique capabilities to varied 
missions performed by 000 or other U.S. Government agencies. but also to the 
unprecedented foreign miLitary and ultimately civi l market potential for the V-22 or 
other deri vative tilt rotor aircraft. Estimates vary but the civil market potential for ti lt 
rotor technology is estimated to be $125-150 billion in U.S. economic activity over the 
first decade of market entry. It can be argued that no other current naval program has 
such a huge potential for benefit to the American economy and in particular the 
A mcrican Aerospace industry. (Osprey fax, 1994, p. 3) 
I', SUMMARY 
The history of the V-22 program was presented in th is Chapter in order to 
provide an understanding of the many complex issues surrounding the troubled history 
of the V-22. Addit ionally, Bell--Racing's visiOn of tilt rotor technology and its civil 
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ap?llc;nion s and benefit to the U.S. eco:lomy were discus'>t'd ( h2.p ter IV wil l 
uHrodllce the Joint Program O ffice wh ich represents the Bell- Boei ng team. An analysis 
o f the Joint Program Office will be presented along with the acquis ition st ra tegies o f 
the loint Primary Aircraft Training System and the FI A-18 program. 
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IV. AVIATION PROGRAMS AND l'ROCUREMEI'oT METHODS 
A. IXfRODCCTION 
Chapter 111 d iscussed the origin and the program management history of the V-
22 Osprey , A chronology of the program was presented with emphasis on DoD's 
efforts to cance l the program during the latter part of the 19!\Os and Congres.,' intent to 
keep the program alive. Chapter IV will analyze the 10int Program Office establi~hcd 
by Bell-Boei ng and its ability to represent the companies to the Government. 
Additionally, the Chapter will look at the Joint Primary Aircraft Training System and 
the FI A·I!! program . 
Numerous interviews were conducted with Government and Bell -Boeing 
officials. The intent of the in terviews was to obtain opinions and insight into the Bell -
Boeing teaming arrangement. Interviews cited within this the,is are composite views of 
opinions and findi ngs of those interviewed. It must be noted that during interviews 
with the Joi nt Program Office, industry officials felt that much of the information 
requested by th is researcher was of a proprietary nature and would not be released. 
Specific types of in formation requested included the teaming agn.>t:ment signed by Bcll 
and Boeing, job descriptions of positions within the loint Progr-"m Office, and the 
overall organiLational structure of the 10int Program Office. Therefore, eltarnination of 
the V-22 lPO for this thesis has been limited by the parent companies. 
B. OSPREY 1V·22 
1. Parent Companies and JPO 
A significant question this researcher had concerning the Bell-Bocing Team was 
why did Bell and Boeing choose each other to form a team for V-22 procurement'? 
According to company officials both companies were working on tilt rotor technology 
and both companies were involved in the XV - IS til t rotor demonstrator. Bell 
Helicopter had been awarded a contract by the Department of the Anny and NASA for 
XV-IS development in 1972. The XV-IS was a follow-on program to Bell's XV-3 ti lt 
rotor program of the 1940s and 19S0s. Later, Boeing was awarded a NASA contract to 
develop advanced tec hnology composite proprotor blades for the XV-JS in 1981. In 
May of 1982 a fonnal teaming agreement was signed by Bell Helicopter, Inc . and 
Boeing-Venol Company. which became Boeing He licopter, Inc., to compete for 
production ot' the upcoming 10int Services Aircraft Program (1 VX). According to a 
Boeing official within the lPO, since the Government desired that a lPO be established 
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ro rep~(; :;.e l't the (WO companies, :he Government preferred to I,ave a Ia~ge com pany 
l(;amed with Bell for this prOJect (Inter .... iew with Anonymous Source, lY'94) 
Cor,versidy, according to a Bell oftici,ll within the lPO, Rell was :ooking I"or a parlnel 
with which to ~hare costs, Bell felt thai there: would be ~ignifieant profits (0 he made 
from rhe: military and commercial appli(;ations of a fully developed tilt rotor aircraft 
Although Bell-Hoeing ofticials wi thin the JPO felt that the relationship between 
the twO teams was a gO<Xi one, there were still prohlems with the learning arrangement. 
For example, the teaming agreemcnt called for a 50/50 split for project and contract 
performance, therefore Bell and Hoeing had to he in agreement on all decisions, 
Another key point of the teaming agreement calls for a )0/50 profit split, howe~'er each 
company is indeDendently building separate portions of the aircraft. Bell is building :he 
wing, rotors, empennage, and nacelles while Roeing is huilding the fuselage, Hight 
controls. 'lOftware and they are also the systems integrator for the cockpit and landing 
gear, Depending on who was heing interviewed at the JPO, the general feeling wa~ 
that their particular company had a larger share of the work efi'ort and should therefore 
be compensated accordingly. 
It should be noted as stated in Chapter I under the FSD contract, Bell was to be 
responsihle for the wing, nacelles, propulsion and dynamics, while Boeing would 
assume responsibility for the fuselage, empennage, avionics and night controls 
However, the acqui.sition strategy has changed and now the Bell-Boeing team will not 
be split as was originally planned. The two companies will remain as a team producing 
~parate portions of the aircraft. According to anonymous Goyernment officials, non-
recuning costs such as tooling to set up two separate pnxiuction lines for the V ·2.2 
would be cost prohibitive, The general feeling now among Government officials 
working on the V-22 procurement i~ that dual-sourcing of large and comple." wealXln 
systems is not a good idea. One of the primary reasons to dual-'lOurce a project is to 
build competition into a prot:urement which should lead to efficiencies among the 
contractors resulting in lower prices to the Government However, as the V-22 
program has progressed and aircraft quantities to be produced have decreased, per unit 
product costs have increased significantly making dual-wurcing economically infeasible 
(Interview with Anonymous Government OfficiaL 19(4). 
The team members independently producing separotte sections of the aircraft, 
drive decisions as to where a particular major component will be built. A Work 
Breakdown Structure (WAS) is used to identify which company has responsibility for 
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subsect ions and a~st'mbl i es o f the respective major cO"lpontnts Acccrding to 
Government officials. the Government along with the JPO monitors this process to 
ensure that the work split ~emains equal. Th is is a managerlll:nt conuol feature the 
Government and parent companies use to halance the level of cffon between parent 
compante~ 
The Joint Program Office is a small organilation con<,j,t.ing of personne l 
sourced from both companies. According [0 company offIcials. the staffi ng for the 
JPO was only to be temporary with specific per"rOnnei working within the JPO for a 
relatively short time. At the end of their ass ignment at the lPO. personnel were to 
transfer back to their respective companies. However, according to Govemment 
sources, certain engineering personnel joined the lPO at its inception and are still 
working there. There now appears to have been a significant turnover in personnel at 
the lPO under the new EMD contract from those rx:rsonnel that worked on the project 
under the old FSD contract. (Interview with Anonymous Government Source, 1994) 
The lines of authority that e~ i sted previously within the lPO continue to e~ist 
today under the EMD contract. 11'0 personnel still report back to the parent companies 
causing increased time for coordination and decision making which continues to be a 
problem for the Government. This i~ to be e~pected since this is a team and not a joint 
venture. The JPO staff currently includes the Program Manager, a Hoeing employee, 
and the Deputy Program Manager, a Bell employee. These positions may be staffed by 
either company but according to Boeing program officials the Program Manager will 
always be a Boeing employee. Hoeing feels that the size of their company in relation to 
that of Bell, along with their position in the industry, j ustifies their leadership of the 
JPO. On the other hand, Rell officials feci that since their company has been involved 
in tilt rotor technology since the \94Os, this justifies their leadership in this area of 
aviation and they should lead the JPO. According to Government officials, the 
Government also has influence as to who will lead the JPO and at th is time is satisfied 
with its organization. 
A Government official commented that there was a startling difference in 
management philosophies of the two companies, Bell and Boeing. The V ·22 was a 
much bigger contr;lCt than either had previously attempted. There were differences in 
the approach to doing business. Te~tron, Bell's owner, was concerned with 
minimizing short-term los~s. Hoeing Corporation was a long-time aircraft 
31 
rnanuf~ctC!rer that knew the ind llstry requirements of long-term investment; u'> 'Jally 
resulting in losses in the early years of a project. (Smith, 1989, p. 35 ) 
nle company', cost schedule control systems were also different. Rell charged 
prop<l~ preparation to overhead while Boeing charged the preparation directly to the 
Individual contract. Boeing had a somewhat structured management hierarchy that 
seemed to restrict the flow of information within the company. Bell. less structured. 
had a more free flow of infonnation. The program was a quantum leap from the 
million dollar projects of which they were accustomed to the billion dollar Y-22 effort. 
(Smith. 1989. p. 36) 
Company cultures were also discussed with Bell-Boeing officials. It was stated 
that it would be hard to find two oompanies with more adverse corporate philosophies. 
Boeing seemed more concerned with schedule where Bell was concerned with cost. It 
was stated there seemed to be a lot of short-term motivation in a long-term industry and 
that this problem was becoming more common in the aerospace industry today. The 
Government is concerned with affordability while corporate stockholders look at this 
year's profits and demand a respectable return on investment. (Smith. 1989. p. 36) 
Bell-Boeing also admitted to difficulties in gauging progress in the early stages 
of the program. Becau~ Ben made the wing assembly and Boeing the fuselage. 
interaction was a source of frustration. especially when interfacing the parts. If the 
mate was off an inch. it presented the problem of finger pointing as to who was at 
fault. (Smith. 1989. p. 37) 
2. Integrated Product Teams 
As a means of coordinating Y-22 production, Bell-Boeing is using Integrated 
Product Teams (lPTs). According to JPO officials. the use of LPTs is growing within 
the aviation industry. Product organized IPTs are new to the EMD contract and appear 
to be working well for the contractors. according to Government officials. me 
breakdown of work corresponds to the requirements specified in the EMD contract. 
For example. the V-22 is broken down panially as follows: 
• Air Vehicles 
• Air Vehicle- Philadelphia, PA 
• Crew System 
• Airframes and Systems 
• Avionics 
• Vehicle Systems 
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• Hardware Components 
• Requirements 
• Integr<lted Test Team-Patuxent River, MD 
• Shipboard 
• Exter:1al Loads 
• Airframes and Systems - Fort Worth. TX 
• A,sembly Build 
• W~ng 
• Rotor 
• Drive System 
• Propulsion 
• Suhsystems and rws 
• Empennage and Ramp 
As previollsly mentioned the lPTs seem 10 be working well. However, a 
po~siblc problem with the lPT organization is the Integrated Test Team located al 
Patuxent River. Maryland. Prior to the EMD contraCt Bell and Boeing maintained 
separate facilities with each company conducting its own Testing and Evaluation 
(T&E) According to Govemment officials, this was an incfticient means of 
conducting T&E. Test results were not communicated in a timely manner to the other 
team member. Now under the EMD contract Bell and Boeing have established a single 
Integrated Test Team staffed by both the parent companies. 
The Naval Aviation Maintenance Program (NAMP) has been established within 
Naval Aviaiton as a means of coordinating and controll ing the effort of work on 
ai rcraft. The NAMP calls for a matrixed organizational structure rhis structure 
provides for an Aircraft Maintenance Officer supported by functional areas such as 
quality assurance, airframe~, power plants, avionics and life suppon systems. An 
integr.u area within the NAMP is the Maintenance Control Section . As its name 
implies. Maintenance Control is the central point for control and documentation within 
a Naval Aviation Squadron. The NAMP is a well-established system which provide~ 
for a means of controlling and documenting the maintenance dfort on Naval Aircrdft. 
In contrast to the NAMP, the Integrated Test Team has no similar organi7Altion. 
According to Government officials, they do not readily see any control or coordination 
at the integrated test site. Although no major problems have occurred which can be 
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amiblJtcd to lack ot- organization at the test site, the Govemme'1t docs nOt have tull 
con fide nl"e in the managerm:nt of the Integrated Test Team . 
C. JOIi'.'"T PRIMARY AIRCRAFT TR~11'o1NG SYSTEM 
A brief overview of two other aviation programs will now be presented for 
comparison: the F/A -\ 8 program, currently in production and the Join, Primary 
Aircraft Training System (JPATS) which is awaiting production. The 1PATS wil! 
likely be a teaming arrangement such as Bell-Boeing's while the F/ A-18 is heing 
procured under a prime-subcontractor relationship. This overview is presented to 
highlight that teaming is still considered a viable means of procurement within 000 
while the more traditional prime-sub relationship, which has advantages over teaming, 
als.o continues to be used 
The world's aerospace industry is anticipating the competition for DoD 's 
JPATS, which could likely provide the winners with thc chance to build upwards of 
1000 aircraft along with a proportionate number of ground-bast(! training systems and 
ancillary equipment. 
The United States Navy and Air Force use a primary training aircraft 10 train 
entry-level student aviators in the fundamentals of flying so they can trdllsition into 
advanced training tracks leading to qualification as military pilolS, navigalOrs, and 
Naval Flight Officers (NFO) . Both Services currently employ primary training aircraft 
with 1950s technology . These aircraft, the Navy's T-34C and the Air Force's T-37B. 
are operationally outdated and increasingly limited in training the ski!1s required in 
follow-on aircraft. (Operational Requirements Document, 1993) 
JPATS will replace the T-34C and the T-37B in undergraduate Naval and Air 
Force pilot training. NFO training, and navigator training. JPATS may also support 
European-NATO joint pilot training. 
The 1989 DoD Trainer Aircraft Masterplan identified the need and opportunity 
for the Navy and Air Force to replace their T-34C and T-37B with a common 
acquisition of the Joint Primary Aircraft Training System. JPATS wi!! employ aircraft, 
simulators, associated ground-based training devices, software. data management 
systems. courseware, and logistics support. The components of JPATS (aircraft, 
simulators, and other ground-based training devices) shall be common. Each Service 
will tailor logistics support to its individual needs and achieve efficiencies within ih 
own infrastmcture. Total contractor logistics support shall be required for all 
4D 
C:Oll1pon~r:ts of each Servi~e'~ grou nd -hascd training sy'itcm. [Opera: lonal Requiremcm s 
Docl:ment. 199]) 
[t is interesting that prod uction of JPATS w ill most likely be accompl i,hed 
t. hrough a teaming strategy . This has occurred due 10 the U. S. military's demand for 
an off-Ihe -she lf airframe which has meant that all but one of the seven known 
contenders for the airframe were designed in other countries. All have been 
substantially redesigned by U.S. companies in collaboration wi th the original designers 
to meet U. S. military requirements. Also, because of the need for a high U.S. work 
content those destined for the U. S. military will be almost entirely produced in the 
U.S. Creams Line Up for 1994 JPATS Showdown, 1993, p. 3) 
Of the se ven contenders for the airframe, current ly the re are six teams and olle 
sole produ(;er competing to produce the JPATS. The contenders are Deech!Pilatus. 
Grumman! Agusta, lockheed! Aermac(;hi. Northrop/Embraer, RockwclIlDa<,a. 
VoughtlFMA. and Cessna. 
Bee(;h Aircraft Corp., a Raytheon company, has teamed with Swiss aircraft 
manufacturer Pi lalUs 10 develop tile turboprop PC.9 Mk. 2 for the JPATS program. 
Gmmman Corp., teamed with Agusta of [taly , has developed the S2IIA, an improved 
version of an aircraft original ly aimed a t an earlier U.S. Air Force trainer competition. 
into a mature, reliable and easily maintainable airhome classroom for the JPATS 
compelltlOn. (Teams Line Up for 1994 JPATS Showdown , (993) Lockheed 
Aeronautical Sy stems Company teamed with Aernautica Macchi of [taly 10 produce the 
MB.339A as their JPATS competitor. Northrop Corp. has teamed with Embrae r of 
Brazil to produce the Embraer Super Tucano 2 for their entry into the JPATS 
competition, Rockwell International' s North American Aircraft Division is teamed 
with Deutsche Aerospace of Germany to develop the Ranger 2{x)() for the JP ATS 
competition, These two companies are also aiming to integrate the aircmft with a 
ground-based training system embodying concepts already developed by Rockwell 
Vought Aircraft Company teamed with FMA of Argentina to develop and propose the 
Pampa 2{X)() Trainer for the JPATS mission, al so has establ ished links with 
A!1 icdSignaI, which will produce the engine and many subsystems for the aircraft. 
Cessna Air(;mft Company. a subsidiary of Textron, Inc., is the only competitor 
proposing an indigenous U.S. design, as well as the only design adapted from a civil jet 
air(;raft, the Cessna Citation1et business aircraft of which two prototypes are currently 
in production. 
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Production of the winning JPATS Aircraft for the U,S. mi litary is likely to 
comin l,e for 15 years or more, or until approxim,ltely 2010. The aircraft and their 
assoc ,ated training sy stems are likely to be in ~rv ice for another 15 - 20 years. In 
addition, the program is expected to be used to develop and demon~trate streamlined 
acqUisition procedures. 000 intends to make increased use of l:Ommercial acquisition 
practices, helping to reform the system that has been in use for many years. 
The JPATS competition has taught the Air Force acquisition people new lessons 
about working with the commercial sector and working with an existing aircraft. 
Partnerships hetween the Government and industry and between the Air Force and 
Navy have also been strengthened. rhe group that put togcther the request for 
proposals (RFP) spent a great deal of time trying to produce as streamlined an RFP as 
possible . (Silverberg, 1994, p. 27) 
Another notable element of this program is the high priority placN on quality 
manufacturing of the aircraft, [n contrast to previous procurements, cost will not be 
thc ultimate determinant. (Silverberg, 1994, p. 24) This is borne out by the sel(X"tion 
criteria which state that while the Government will strive for maximum objoctivity in 
making its award, SUbjective judgment on the part of Government evaluators is implicit 
in the source selection process. 
The award of a JPATS contract currently expected in the spring of 1995 will 
start a second round of competition, this one for the Ground-Based Tr.llning System 
(GBTS). A GBTS award is anticipated 12-14 months after the prime contract award. 
The original JPATS acquisition stnltegy called for the prime contract bidders to pick 
GBTS partners and enter the competition as a team. However, in a 1992 dialogue 
between the Services' and the Pentagon's civilian leadership, Donald Yockey, then 
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition , changed the acquisition strategy. His 
primary concern was how to give the prime contractor total system responsibility when 
the Government was going to make the GBTS selection. This contradicted thc 
Government's desire to hold an open competition. (Teams Line Up for 1994 JPATS 
Showdown, 1993) 
When GBTS was an integral part of the competition, British Aerospace, LQrJ.!, 
and CAE-Link had all teamed up with the competitors. These companies are all as 
interested as before even with the change in acquisition strategy. Additionally, major 
training and simulation companies that were not originally teamed arc eycing the GBTS 
compet!IJon too. "We're in the decision-making process," said Robert O' Brien, 
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d irector o t ;JlJblic re lation s I'D' McDonnell Douglas. Also, Hughc\ T ra in ing "pla n, to 
be a major piaycr in [hal competition." '>aid Rick Oyler Hughes' marketi ng and 
com munications specialist. (Si lverberg: . 1994, p. 21) 
n. F/A·18 PROGRAM 
The FlA-l ?; Naval Strike fightt:f is a twin -engine. mid-wing, multi -mission. 
tactical aircraft. McDonnell Douglas Aerospace Corporation (MDA) is the prime 
contractor and Northrop COf1Xlration i., a first-tier subCOnlr~(;tor (Interview with Lisa 
Malt , 19'014) . McDonnell Douglas and Northrop refcr to themselves as a team 
although this is not a formal team ing arrangement as is Llsed by Bell -Boeing . Th:: 
"team" of i\IOA and Northrop have del ivered more than 1.240 1"1 A-1 8 Hornel strike 
fighters . The Hornet flTst entered operational military service in 1983. As principal 
subcontractor to MDA in St. Louis, Northrop proouces the 26-foot-long center and aft 
fuse lage sections, twin vertical stabilizers and all associated suhsy , tems for the FI A- 18 
at its Aircraft Division faci lities in Hawthorne and EI Segundo, California. (interview 
with Terry Claussen, 1994) 
Northrop has deliven:d more than 1,240 F/A-IS shipsets to l\-tDA, the program 
integrator, who then completes assembly of the aircraft. Northrop considers a shipsct 
to be Ihe center and aft fuselage and the twin vertical tails along with their associatcd 
subsy<,tems . For the FY-93 procurement, a Defense Plant Repre>.entative Office 
(DPRO) official stated that MDA contributcO 71 % of the aircraft dollar value whik 
Northrop contributed 29% . ( Interview with Anonymous DPRO Official , 1994) 
However. the Northrop puhlicity office stated that the work splil for the FY -93 
procurement was 60% MlJA and 40% Northrop (Interview with Terry Claussen, 
1994). 
As previously stated, the F/A-18 is being procured under a formal prime/sub-
contractor relationship. however MDA and Northrop call themselves a ~tcam." Since 
MDA is the prime contractor , they arc liable for the su(;Cess or failure of the program. 
while Nonhrop is content with their position as subcontractor. An anonymous MDA 
official commenting on the ~t~m" of MDA and Northrop praised Northrop as a qual ity 
mallufacturer with a solid reputation within the aerospace industry. I'or e)(ample. 
MDA praised Northrop for winning the Air Force's prestigious Contractor Productivity 
Award three years in a row for achievements on the F/A- 18 program, In 1984, 
Northrop won the award for achievements in quality and reliability, in 1985 for cost 
roouctions in direct labor, and in 19!i6 fo r cost reductions in materiel and subcontracts. 
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Designated to replace rhe F-4 PHANTOM and A-7 CORSAIR. the F"/A- lS IS 
employed in Navy and Marine Corps Strike Fighter Squadrons. Single and two-seat 
variants with a Night /Austere All-Weather capability an: being delivered. The FlA.-IS 
uses external equipment to accomplish specific tighter or attack missions This 
capability offers the operational commander mOTe flexihility in employ ing his tactical 
aircraft in changing scenarios. The primary design missions arc fighter escort and 
interdiction with fleet air defense and close air support as additional roles. Since the 
same airframe, engine. flight control, and weapon systems are used on attack missions 
as well as on fighter missions. excellent fighter and self-defense capability is ret,lincd. 
One thousand eighty-six aircraft are scheduled to be built, cleven of which were 
prototype aircraft funded within the RDT&E appropriation. (F/A 18 cm HORNET. 
1993) 
1. Engines 
The Navy procured F404-GE-4{KJ (-400) engines to power the f'/A-18 aircr.tft 
beginning with the full .<,cale development contract in 1976. The engines were procured 
sole-source from General Electric (GE) from 1978 to 1987. Beginning in FY-87, 
engines were procured competitively in a dual-source program from GE and Pratt & 
Whitney. The dual-source competitive contracts were approved for FY -88 through fY-
92 for F404-GE-400 engine requirements. However, in fY -89 a decision was made to: 
(I) provide the opportunity for a split award or a 100% huyout; (2) extend the 
contract(s) through fY-95; (3) add FMS option line items; and (4) add option line 
items for Kuwait and USN F404-GE-402 (-402) engines beginning in FY-90 and FY-
91. respectively. The FY-89 competition resulted in a 100% award to GE for FY-90 
through FY-95. This contract contains not-to-exceed prices for the -402, the 
additionaL, unique effort to modify the -400 engine to a -402 configuration. Although 
competitively awarded before, competitive procurement of the FY-96 and FY-97 -402 
engine requirements is not considered feasible. Acquisition using other than full and 
open competition under the authority of 10 USc. 2304(c)(1), as implemented hy FAR 
6.302-1 will be employed to satisfy this requirement, otherwise substantiaL duplication 
of costs to the Government that cannot be recovered through competition would be 
incurred and unacceptable delays in fulfilling the requirements would occur. GS is 
now the sole producer. With the extensive prior investment in establishing GE' s 
existing expenise and production capacity, GE is the only viable source to meet the 
Government's requirement. Firm-fixed-price contracts for FY-96 and FY-97 engine 
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rcq ll1rerllCntS will be Rwardcd to OF on a sole - ~Ol;rce basis. I F.'A 18 C/ D HORNET. 
!99.1) 
2. Current Condilions 
rhe FiA-1R ,,"cajXJIl system ~ucccs,fu!l y completed full- scale development <lnd 
is in its production phase. McDonne ll Douglas Aerospace and its subcontractors have 
demonstrated the capability lO perform on schedule at predictable and reasonable cost 
No unusual cost, schedule. capability or performance constraints are known or 
anticipated at this time. Projected quantities may be altered by direction of Congress 
and approvcO by the Secretary of Defense or by the addition of any Foreign Mil itary 
Sales (FMS) for which Letters of Agreement (LOAs) are executed . Coordination 
between MDA, major Government Furnished Equipment (G FE) providers, and major 
sub tier contractor~ is required to ensure that GFE and contractor-furnished equipment 
integr.ltions are accomplished and maintaine<i. In join! production bllYs, USN and 
FMS customers will share lower costs on items which are common to each aircraft. 
Items unique to the USN or a FMS customer are charged separately . Thc F/A- IS 
aircraft is outfitted with ancillary equipment which is compatible with existing 
armament systems. This provides the PIA-IS aircraft the flexibility of using in-stock 
mllnitions. (Interview with Li<;a Matt, 1994) 
MDA and GE are the only contractors that can meet the requi.red sche<iule. The 
use of any other engine for this program would result in a substantial delay. and 
duplication of cost to the Government for development, logistics support, and support 
equipment. The current F/ A-I S progrdm contains substantial GFE, due principally to 
an aggressive breakout program to control CQst and enhance competition. (Interview 
with Lisa Malt, \994) The F/A-18CID production program receivoo Milestone III 
authority on Dcccmher 1982 with no major milestone reviews remaining related to 
current production . The program, now a mature system, has completed Milestone JI1 
and is nearing the end of production. 
3. Alternatives 
Alternate acquisition approaches are not considered appropriate for the airframe. 
engine and training system upgrade since MDA and GE are the only viable sources 
who can meet the Government's requirement and schedule nce<is. Reimtitution of the 
GEJPratt and Whitney dual·source for FY -95 through PY-97 is not considered feasible 
in view of the reduced procurement quantities and the cost to re-establish a second 
(Interview with Larry Rosendorf, 1994) 
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4. Snurces 
Manufacture of the F/A·l8 aircraft ~quires an intimate familiarity with the 
approp:"iate design and engineering details. e~tensive production engineering. and all 
extended period of pn~paration for manufacture (Interview with Lisa II.latt, 1994) 
MDA is the sale designer, developer. integrator, and producer of the current versions 
of the F/ A·18 aircraft. MDA is thc only firm which possesses the requisite knowledge 
of the aircraft's design, manufacture, operation and maintenance neces!'.ary to meet the 
Government's requirement. Further. thc Government does not own a full F/A· i8 
technical data package. It would be prohibitively expensive and time consuming to 
procure these rights . Only MDA has adequate existing facilities, tooling, and ~pe('ial 
test equipment to perform the Government's minimum needs to provide acceptable 
aircraft in an accurate and timely manner. (F/A 18 C/O HORNET. 1993) 
Monitoring of each contractor's production is accomplished by a »eries of 
Government management information reports. This includes appropriate Contract 
Funds Status Reports (CFSR), which are submitted by the contractor in accordance 
with DoD instructions and the Contract Data Requirements List (CDRI.). Monthly 
progress reports and periodic business and technical reviews by F/A-18 project 
management officials are supplemented by Jaily contacts between the l:ontractor and 
the Defense Plant Representat ive Office at each contractor's main assembly plant. 
Periodic audits review each contractor's internal controls. The Cost/Schedule Control 
Systems Criteria (C/SCSC) will not be applied to this procurement. 
5. Subcontracting Plan" 
Special incentives for small business/small di!'.advantaged businesses 
subcontracting will be negotiated pursuant to fAR 19.708(c)(I) under individual 
contract actions. Under a ronnal "Ieaming" arrangement between MDA and Northrop 
Corporation, for each applicable procuremenl, Northrop will submit its own plan which 
will be separately reviewed and approved. (F/A 18 CID HORNET, 1993) 
GE has established a Master Subcontracting Program for small businesses and 
small businesses owned by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals. GE 
also submits specific goals for each individual procurement. These goals are then 
reviewed by NAVAIR before any new procurements are executed. Special incentives 
for small business/small disadvantaged businesses subcontracting will be negotiated 
pursuant to FAR 19.708(c)(I) under individual contract actions. NAVAIR is presently 
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invol ved in a pnX:CS5 of identifying additionil l ~llbcontrilc\Or~ who may be used by (ir. 
in the future 
E. CONCLUSION A:"rrIU SL~L\1AnY 
In November of 1992 the American people elected Bill Climon, President of the 
United Swtes. i\ key plank of hi s p lat for m was deficit reductlOn and the continuing 
decline tn defense spending. As weapon systems continue to innease in compic'l:ily. 
their as'-OCiated program costs will also continue to inCfease. ThiS coupled with 
decreased 4uantities to be purchased for a given system funher increases unit pnce of 
individual systems. Given the fi>cally constrained environment that exists today . the 
acquisition of major weapon systems is becoming more politicized than ever before. 
The pressure for Congressmen to "bring home the pork" is inncasing in direct 
propoI1ion to the decrease in GOVl:rnment spending and in particular defense spending. 
As previollsly discussed . the V-22 is being procuTt-'<l under a teaming stra tegy 
and thl: JPATS wi ll likely be procured through teaming. The F/A·IS is being procurcd 
under a fonnal prime/sub-contractor relationship. While this does not fit the formal 
definition of contractor teaming as presented in Chapter II, to this researcher the 
arrangement appears to be a better relationship than the Bell-Boeing team. JPATS and 
the PIA-I!! programs enjoy substantial support within the 000 as well as on Capitol 
Hill, while the V-22 enjoys greater suppon from the Congress than from 000. The 
ability for these and other programs to survive during periods of reduced defense 
spending may be affected by the strategy employed for their procurement. 
This Chapter eJ[amined the V-22 program management and in panicular thc JPO 
established by the Bell-Boeing team. The lines of authority wi th in the JPO we re 
discussed as well as the Integrated Product Teams, specifically the Integrated Test 
Team at PaJ[ River. The JPATS was introduced to highlight the trend towards learni ng 
within the aerospace industry. While the manufacmrer for JPATS has not been 
selected, the winning contractor for this system will likely be a team consisting of a 
domestic and foreign manufacturer. The F/ A-IS program was pre~nted in order to 
contrast an alternate acquisition strategy to contractor teaming as used by Bell-Boeing . 




v. flNDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. INTROUUCTIO:\' 
['he purpose of this thesis was to look at the program management arrangement 
of the v -22 Osprey tilt rotor aircraft, how the Joint Program Office was organiLed by 
Bell and Boe ing and how this organilat ion represented the parent companies to the 
Government. ['his thesis has provided an overview of the V-22 progrJm A 
background o f dual sourcing of major weapon systems was discussed in Chatlter II. 
nTis Chapter looked at the methods of dual-sourcing. Of the five methods presented. 
contractor learning and leader-follower were discussed. The V-22 program was used as 
an example of teaming while the MK-48 ADeAP was used as an example of Icader-
follower. This Chapter explored the idea of 000 using dual-sourcing to provide 
competition in Government procurements which should then work to provide lower 
prices for the Government. The Competition In Contracting Act of 1984 has had a 
significant imp~Kt on the way the Government manages its procurement functions and it 
is now generally believed that competition lowers price~ and improves proouct quality 
and dual-sourcing was intended as a means of increasing competition for the Osprey 
and MK-48 ADCAP torpedo. 
C hapter III discussed the history of the V-22 progmm whieh traced the 
progr.am ' s progress starting with the e~perimental XV-3 through thl:! XV - IS research 
aircraft. Additionally, th is Chapter showl:!d how the V·22 progrdm survived while 
constantly faced with continual scrutiny, cancellation and uncertainty. Attempted 
program cancel lations by DoD were discussed as well as Congressional reactions to 
these attempts. Throughout this program's history, Congressional support for tilt rotor 
technology and its military and commercial applications has been strong. 
Organization of the loint Program Office was pre~nted in Chapter IV. 
Numerous interviews with Government and Bell-Boeing officials detailed the 
impressions and opinions of this report. Reasons for forming a team were discussed 
along with the division of work between the two companies and how profits were to he 
divided. Sourcing of personnel to the fPO was al~ presented along with the general 
length of their assignment. Di fferences in both companies' mamlgement philosophies 
as well their cultures were discussed. 
JPATS and the F/A- 18 program were a lso presented in Chapter IV. While the 
~lection of a contractor to build the lPATS has not been decided, wi th the exception of 
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Cessna. the prod ucer will likely be a team consisting of both n foreign and domestic 
aircraft manufacturer. Like the v-n, the JPATS will probably be in production well 
;nto the next century. With thi s program, DoD is looking to make lise of increased 
commercial acquisition practices which should fun her help reform the acquisition 
process. The increased use of commercial acquisition practices w?.s a key point of The 
National Performance Review. 
The rl A-I S current ly being produced by McDonnell Douglas, with Northrop as 
a subcontractor, is procured under a prime-sub contracting strategy which is completely 
different from the V-22 acquisition. Additionally, the procurement of the F404-GE-
400 engines used to power the F/ A- l S was presented. These engines are currently 
being procured via sole-source from General Electric, although the dual-source strategy 
was used in FY-S7. However. the dual-source strategy was canceled in FY-89 due to 
substantial duplication of cost to the Government which could not be recovered through 
competition. Similarly as was noted with the V-22 program, the original dual· soureing 
strategy which was to occur by splitting the Hell-Boeing team has been canceled. Non-
recurring costs made the dual-sourcing strategy unacceptable for the V -22 while 
substantial duplication of costs made dual-sourcing unacceptable for FI A-18 engines. 
B. FTh"DINGS IN RESPONSE TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The first and last subsidiary research questions, "What is the contracmal 
relatioflship between Bell and Boeing" and "Can the respective companies present a 
~ing le face to the Government,"' were answered in Chapters III and IV. [n May of 
1982 Bell and Boeing entered into a formal teaming agreement which contractually 
bound the parent companies to each other for the manufacture of the V-22. This 
agreement made both companies jointly liable for the project and contract perfonnance. 
With a cost-plus-award-fee contract in place during EMD, each company is paid for 
costs incuITed during production of their respective component or assembly. However, 
profits are spli t on a 50/50 basis. This arrangement seems to have created tension 
between the respective contractors and the Government since each contractor is 
constantly aware of the levels of contribution to the project. 
The teaming agreement established a loint Program Oftice which was to 
represent the parent companies to the Government. As DoD uses Defcflsc Plant 
Representative Offices to represent the Government by presenting a single face to 
ifldustry. so has Bell -Boeing attempted to present a single face to the Government via 
the lPG . However, as numerous Government officials noted during interviews, the 
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JPO not presented a single fa:e to the Government In several cases when 
questions were asked of the JPO by Government official" representatives from the 
respective companies gave different a~swer5 to the same quesllon This created 
fnlstration fo r Ihc Government which usually resulted in the Government going directly 
to the parent companies for information , thereby bypassing the JPO. 
The second subsidiary research question was "What aTC the principal diffic ulties 
associated with the learning arrangement?" According 10 Government sources. it is 
harder to deal with a learning arrangement as opposed to a prime-sub relationship. In a 
teaming situation. there is usually double the amount of work to be done. In the case 
of the v -n, there afC two production sites being used, one in Fort Worth, TX by Bell 
and the other in Philadelphia, PA by Boeing. This means two separate DPROs must be 
used for contract administration. one at each site. Contract specialists at NAVAIR told 
th is rcsearcher that "Everything is twice as hard." In addition, thcre aTe the two 
separate company's systems covcring such areas as cost, estimating and management 
information that must be monitored and evaiuaterl by the Govern'flcnt . 
By maintaining the team into production. Bell-Boeing has rerlucerl the possibility 
of unauthorized transfe r or disclosure of technical data or trade secrets. Company 
officials admitted that under the initial strategy when the team was to split once the 
program was in production, the 'lafeguarding of technical data and trade secrets was a 
primary concern to each company. Since eaeh company's expertise lies in differcnt 
areas of manufacturing, as evidenced by the work split between the two companies, 
under the new strategy each company will now be able to protect any tiJde secrets or 
technical data from being compromised since the team will not be spli t once in 
production . 
As was mentioned in Chapter If, a possible problem with contraA;tor teaming is 
that the team members may not want to split the team when the project ends. It 
appears that Ben-Boeing may have faced Ihis problem since the le<lm will no longer be 
split during production. The Government appears to have solverl this problem for the 
companies; because of the high costs of establishing a second source, the team will not 
Ix split. In effect this now gives Bell -Boeing the power of being a sole-source 
producer and the advantages to be gainerl from dual-sourcing will not be realized. 
The answer to the third subsidiary research question, ~Can teaming facilitate 
performance in the best interest of the Government and the respect ive contrJctors?" 
appears to be maybe. As the cost of major weapon systems continues to increase and 
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tre number of systcms purchased decreases, manufacturers will increasingly fmd it 
difficult to compete in th is area . One possible means of remaining competitive is 
contractor teaming. As companies tcam for major systems, this has the effect of 
preserving the industrial base while helping companies to remain in business. Since the 
V-22 program will probably cOSt in e:oteess of S10 billion. teaming has alloweD Bell-
Boeing to ,lSsume a lesser amount of risk than had they been a prime contractor. 
However, as the multi-billion dollar riA-IS program is nearing the end of its 
production, McDonnell Douglas Aerospace has shown that they can effective iy manage 
risk to proouce a major weapon system using a prime-sub relationship. 
Lessons learned from the V-22 program: 
• Dual -sourcing of large and complc:ot weapon systems does not result in 
significant savings. Because of the inaease<! costs of starting a sC(:ond 
proouction line the team of Bell-Boeing will flot be split. 
• Personnel in a loint Program Office maintain their allegiance to the parent 
companies. Since a team is not a joint venture the parent companies e:otercise 
control over their individuals in the lPG. For the V-22. this has been 
inefficient and time consuming. 
• Joint programs such as the V-22 must receive the full support of thc 
individual Services. Once the Anny withdrew from the program the total 
number of aircraft to be bought significantly decrease<!. This lead to the 
increased cost of the program to the remaining Services which may help to 
explain Secretary Cheney's opposition to the progrdffi thereby putting the 
entire acquisition in jeopardy 
C. CONCLCSIONS 
It appears to this researcher that the acquisition of the V-22 has not been 
efticient. During the Bush administration. Secretary Cheney tried to kill the program 
in order to save costs in the short run but this strategy ran into opposition in the 
Congress who kept the program alive. If the V-22 continues into proouction. the result 
will be a significantly reduced number of aircraft bought and at a considerable increase 
in unit cost. 
As we continue into the 1990s, defense budgets will remain constrained and the 
U.S. Government can not continue to waste billions of dollars on unneeded programs 
or on inefficient acquisition strategies. As the U.S. Government strives to maintain a 
viable national defense and an economically &>und industrial base during periods of 
52 
constrained b'Jdgels . programs must be drslgrtt>d which car. tai<.c fuil advantage ot any 
potential fo re ign mi litary sales and morc importantly. commercial appiications. This 
means that (he \'-22, while ;'l!~filli ng a critical need in Naval Aviation. will abo 
generate the technoiogy needed fo r the maintenance of a strong industria l base. 
There is also the consideration lnat if tilt ro tor technology is not deve loped in 
the United States by companies such as Bell and llocing, this capability may be lost to 
Japan or Europe. The Depanment of Defense should not be made to carry the entire 
burden of developing cri tical technologics lhat have direct commercial appl icat ions 
Congress should look at ways of funding "critical national technologies" as a means 01 
mai ntaining the United States' position in advancoo technology developmcnt among 
world competi tors. 
D. RECO-,1M.ENUATIOI\·S 
If contractor teaming is to be used for the acquisition of large and complex 
weapon systcms. om: of the companies should be designated as the lead or prime team 
member having contractual liability for contract perfonnance . This would place the 
responsibility for project and contract performance in the hands of one. company. This 
improves accountability and relieves the Government of monitoring more than one 
contractor. This would also solve the problem of contractors nol presenting a sing lc 
face to the Government since a JPO would not be needed and the Government would 
monitor only Ihe lead or prime team member. 
For mul ti ·service acquisitions. Services should not be allowed to withdraw from 
a program once they have comntitted to its acquisition . "Inere have been numerous 
examples in the past of DoD acquiring and attempting to acquire wcapon systems to 
mcet Ihe needs of more than one Service. Some of Ihese have been successful such "s 
the f'-4 Phantom and the UH-l Huey, while others, such as the F-lli. have been 
fai lures. Without attempting to explain the success or failure of these prior weapon 
systems, it is clear that when more than onc Service sup[X)ns a program. that program 
has a greater chance of Success. When the Army withdrew from the V-22 program. 
th is had a significant and detrimental effect on the entire program. With the Army's 
withdrawal, suppon decreased and costs increased. It is still not clear whether the V· 
22 program will survive. If the program does not survive, the Marinc Corps will stil l 
be in the position of trying to replace an old and obsolete aircraft with a newer and 
more capahle system. 
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E. AREAS lOR FURTHER STUDY 
There have been areas ment ioned throughout this thesis that require additional 
research. Some of these are summarized below · 
• The ahili ty of the Government to successfuliy build competition into an 
acquISition . 
• The effects of DCA during pl:rioos of decreased Federal spending and a 
shri nking industria l base. 
• The funding and development of "critical national tec hnologies" by the 
Congress rather than hy DoD or any other executive department or agency 
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